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This thesis is an analysis of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
European Committee of Social Rights arising from austerity measures in the European 
sovereign debt crisis. The thesis considers the protection afforded to socio-economic interests 
under the two systems, and how this protection has been tested by the challenges arising from 
the economic crisis. 
The first chapter is an analysis of the ‘social Euro-crisis cases.’ Brought under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 to the ECHR the measures enacted to reduce government spending were an 
alleged violation of the right to property. Almost all of the social Euro-crisis cases were held 
to be inadmissible by the Court, which cited the gravity of the economic crisis in the 
respondent states and the executive’s margin of appreciation in matters of social and 
economic policy. 
The second chapter places the social Euro-crisis cases in context temporally and thematically, 
in considering two previous lines of case law developed by Strasbourg: financial and 
economic stability, and emergency and ‘exceptional circumstances’. The ECtHR decisions 
focus on the severity of the crisis, determining that the margin of appreciation is broader in 
such circumstances. 
The ECtHR section concludes that it does not appear that the European sovereign debt crisis 
has seen Strasbourg develop any definitive ‘crisis approach’ to ensure that Convention rights 
are protected in times of economic instability. 
The third chapter examines the case law generated by the European Committee of Social 
Rights during the same period. This section serves to act as a counterpart to the ECtHR 
section. The Committee emphasised that times of crisis require socio-economic rights to be 
protected, and finds many of the challenged austerity measures incompatible with the 
European Social Charter.  
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The ‘Conscience of Europe’ in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis: an analysis of the 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Committee of 
Social Rights.1 
 
1. Social rights protection in the financial and sovereign debt crises.  
This thesis engages in a case law analysis of certain judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Committee on Social Rights on cases arising from austerity 
measures implemented to tackle the European sovereign debt crisis. The thesis gauges the 
response of the two bodies to the crisis, and critically analyses the reasoning in the cases. 
Human rights bodies have stressed that the economic crisis has had a profound effect upon 
human rights, and that fundamental rights require greater protection during such periods.2 
This area of law that is rapidly evolving and this thesis explores how two of the human rights 
bodies of the Council of Europe have responded to the crisis by critically analysing some of 
the cases which have been decided.  
The financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis3 have caused 
severe hardship in Europe; the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the 
EU accounts for nearly a quarter of the entire population, as of 20124, the rates of material 
deprivation in the EU5 stood at 23% in 2010.6 The enormous social cost of the crisis years is 
now beginning to be reflected in the data - there is a time lag in effect with regard to 
calculating these rates.7 This also has ramifications for any legal proceedings where the social 
impact of a given measure must be assessed by the court.  
                                                          
1 The author is very grateful for the supervision, guidance and encouragement of Prof. Claire Kilpatrick (EUI) 
throughout the project. All errors remain those of the author. 
2 Fundamental Rights Agency Press Release 06.12.2012, ‘The crisis is a time to boost access to justice’ 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/press-release/2012/crisis-time-boost-access-justice, accessed 28.09.2015. 
3 Precise timelines are difficult to establish, but for the purposes of my analysis I consider the request of 
Hungary for a Stand-By Arrangement from the IMF after consulting the EU to mark the transition from 
financial crisis to the sovereign debt crisis. See Council Decision (2009/102/EC)of 4 November 2008 providing 
Community medium-term financial assistance to Hungary.   
4 See the Annual Report of the Social Protection Committee of the European Commission, ‘Social Europe: 
Current Challenges and the Way Forward’ (2012), p. 8. 
5 Calculated by Eurostat as the proportion of people whose living conditions are severely affected by a lack of 
resources: European Commission – Eurostat, ‘Material Deprivation Statistics – Early Results’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Material_deprivation_statistics_-_early_results, 
accessed 23 March 2015. 
6 Eurostat Issue number 9/2012, ‘23% of EU citizens were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2010’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-statistics-in-focus/-/KS-SF-12-009, accessed 31 March 2015.  
7 See ibid no. 4, ‘Context’.  
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2. Where might the Council of Europe fit into this crisis narrative? 8  
As the pre-eminent human rights organisation in Europe, it has been said that the Council of 
Europe has assumed an enhanced role for those suffering hardship caused by austerity 
measures. In the case of the ECtHR, the right of individual petition has, according to Judge 
Tulkens, required that the Convention system develop into one of quasi-constitutional 
protection.9 With the enactment of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the right of individual 
petition is guaranteed to citizens of all High Contracting States. This breadth of application 
could also be said to be matched with a corresponding increase in the sophistication of the 
strategies and reasoning used by the ECtHR. Judge Tulkens claims that the right of individual 
petition means that the ECtHR has assumed the role of a constitutional protector throughout 
Europe, and also states that the increasing volume of the Court’s case law has allowed it to 
develop more probing and sophisticated methods for ensuring that Convention rights are 
being upheld in the Contracting States – “there has been a qualitative evolution... If the 
Convention as an instrument is a scalpel, it has gone from scraping the surface to making 
deep incisions.”10 It may be true that as Strasbourg has matured and added to the growing 
corpus of its case law, its decision making has become more insightful and penetrating. If that 
be the case, then the brevity of the judgments in the cases below, and the cursory examination 
given to the issues presented by the applicants to the ECtHR do not match this development 
in qualitative terms.  
This claim of Judge Tulkens that the sophistication of Strasbourg’s jurisdiction has developed 
in conjunction with its case load is perhaps to counter the criticism that Strasbourg is 
overextending its reach into the domain of national authorities. The circumstances of how and 
why the Convention was enacted have also been mentioned by commentators in recent times, 
in response to claims that international human rights tribunals ought to defer more to the 
prerogatives of the national authorities in times of crisis. Robert Spano has stated: “The 
European Convention is....based on the underlying premise that serious human rights 
problems and their adequate assessment sometimes necessitate a distant perspective, a 
                                                          
8 The Council of Europe bodies have been prolific in issuing opinions on the crisis. See Ana Gómez Heredero 
,‘Social Security as a Human Right: The protection afforded by the European Convention on Human Rights’, 
Human Rights Files, No. 23., Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Safeguarding Human Rights in Times of 
Crisis’, Issue Paper 2013.  
9 Françoise Tulkens,‘The contribution of the European Convention on Human Rights to the poverty issue in 
times of crisis’ European Court of Human Rights – European Judicial Training Network Seminar on Human 
Rights for European Judicial Trainers Strasbourg 8 July 2014,  p. 22. 
10 Ibid. 
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viewpoint taken away from the internal domestic bubble, where the individual participants in 
the legal process –be it parliamentarians, executive officials or members of the judiciary–may 
have difficulty or, in some states, are unwilling to examine the controversial issues 
implicating human rights with the necessary objectivity that distance provides”.11 These two 
opinions, from senior ECtHR figures, are worth bearing in mind when the case law is being 
considered. 
The Collective Complaints Mechanism of the European Social Charter was the first quasi-
judicial process in international human rights law established specifically to deal with socio-
economic rights claims.12 Although hampered by structural features which mean that the 
reach and impact of the ECSR’s judgments and statements on the Charter lags far behind that 
of its sibling ECHR system, the number of Collective Complaints registered with the 
European Committee on Social Rights has more than doubled since the onset of the crisis, 
and the Committee has issued some thought-provoking decisions on austerity measures, 
reaffirm that contracting states have a responsibility to uphold their socio-economic rights 
obligations even in times of economic crisis. Tulkens’ assertion may be said to be equally 
applicable to the ECSR. 
3. Structure of the thesis 
The central premise of the thesis concerns challenges to austerity measures. The two human 
rights instruments under consideration, the Convention system and the Charter system, each 
protect a certain set of partially overlapping rights and interests, and the cases reflect this. 
Two of the most prevalent issues of the economic crisis are employment protection and 
public sector salaries and pensions. I consider public sector wages and pensions and social 
welfare payments in the ECHR section and labour reforms and pension reforms in the ECSR 
section. 
The ECHR cases are concerned with the protection of property under Article 1 of Protocol 1, 
as I believe these cases demonstrate the most apparent link between socio-economic interests 
and austerity measures in the current crisis. Although the Convention does protect the 
freedom of association under Article 11, I have opted to focus on the A1P1 cases as 
                                                          
11 Robert Spano, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and National Courts: A Constructive Conversation or a 
Dialogue of Disrespect?’ (2015) 33 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 1, p. 4. 
12 Neliana Rodean, ‘Social rights in our backyard: ‘Social Europe’ between standardization and economic crisis 
across the continent’ in Marilisa D’Amico and Giovanni Guiglia (eds), European Social Charter and the 
Challenges of the XXI century/La Charte Sociale Européenne et Les Défis Du XXIe Siècle (Edizioni Scientifiche 
Italiane s.p.a 2014), p. 47. 
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representing the most developed thinking between socio-economic rights in the crisis and 
austerity measures. Two of the social Euro-crisis cases that I consider – N.K.M. v Hungary 
and R.Sz. v Hungary, deal with redundancy payments and reference the social goal of 
minimising unemployment and labour reintegration, but are considered by the ECtHR under 
A1P1. 
I do, however, consider complaints relating to labour rights under the European Social 
Charter system. The labour related complaints stem directly from the austerity measures, and 
labour rights are an economic right under the ESC, whereas I consider that freedom of 
association, collective bargaining and the right to strike as protected under Article 11 ECHR 
falls outside of the rubric of my social rights-austerity analysis. 
The first chapter examines a number of cases brought before the European Court of Human 
Rights, ranging from 2010 to 2015. These cases were selected because they each illustrate 
different issues that have reflected on the challenges of pursuing socio-economic rights 
claims before the ECtHR in the economic crisis. All of the cases come from states which 
were involved in some kind of sovereign loan assistance programme, or had been involved in 
one a short time prior to the filing of the case; Greece, Portugal, Hungary, Latvia and 
Romania. All of the cases are primarily concerned with Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the 
Convention, the right to property. The reaction of the respondent states to the economic crisis 
has been by implementing a programme of austerity measures.13 Salaries and pensions in the 
public sector, along with social welfare payments, have borne the brunt of this reduction in 
government spending, and consequently the legal challenges taken up against austerity 
measures at the ECHR level have focused on the protection of property. 
The cases are arranged along a spectrum, with the greatest cluster of factors emblematic of 
the issues of socio-economic rights claims in the European sovereign debt crisis in the 
‘bailout’ Euro-crisis cases from Greece and Portugal, tapering towards cases where the links 
with the crisis are more oblique, in the Hungarian, Latvian and Romanian cases.   
Having examined the ‘social Euro-crisis cases’, Chapter II focuses on broader analogous 
themes: the first is financial stability and the role of international financial institutions. The 
second theme is the concept of emergency under the ECHR and the link between the concept 
of emergency and the justification for the greater deference to the executive is the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ at issue – also invoked by the ECtHR in the social Euro-crisis 
                                                          
13 Vani K. Borooah, Europe in an Age of Austerity (Palgrave Macmillan 2014), p. 2. 
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cases.  The third chapter looks at the other instrument under consideration: the European 
Social Charter and the quasi-judicial body tasked with upholding its guarantees, the European 
Committee of Social Rights. The strengths and drawbacks of the Charter system are 
discussed, and a selection of Collective Complaints concerning the economic crisis in Greece 
is examined. The first two Complaints concern employment and collective bargaining under 
the Charter, while the latter five are a bundle of complaints which concern structural 
adjustments to Greece’s pension system. In light of the Committee’s reasoning and decisions 
on the Complaints, what the crisis has meant for the role of the Committee and the Charter 
system in the European sovereign debt crisis is considered.  
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Chapter I: The Social Euro-Crisis Cases of the European Court of Human Rights 
1. Overview 
This chapter will examine claims brought before the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereafter the ECtHR, the Strasbourg Court, the Court, unless otherwise stated) challenging 
measures taken to address the severe fiscal difficulties confronting some contracting states as 
a result of the European sovereign debt crisis (here taken as dating from 2008 onwards.) 
Where relevant, the global financial crisis of 2008 will also be considered. 
I consider firstly how the ECtHR has read the protection socio-economic rights into the 
Convention, and whether this protection may have changed during, and perhaps as a result of 
the crisis. I analyse a certain set of cases that have come before the ECtHR, which I term 
‘social Euro-crisis cases.’ 
1.1 Does the European Convention protect socio-economic interests? 
I submit that aside from the right to education and the right to property, the Convention is not 
an instrument that protects socio-economic rights. Protection has been extended to certain 
socio-economic interests that form part of the civil and political rights enshrined in the 
Convention.14 In its development of a number of its interpretative tools, the ECtHR has 
elaborated on the protection of socio-economic facets of the rights enshrined in the 
Convention. In the case of Tyrer v The United Kingdom in 1978, Strasbourg first iterated its 
‘living instrument’ doctrine: “The Court must also recall that the Convention is a living 
instrument which, as the Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions.”15 Attempts have been made to progressively extend the protection of 
the Convention to situations involving socio-economic rights violations. In the case of Airey v 
Ireland it was held that civil and political rights often possess an economic or social 
dimension.16 Certain commentators have argued that the ECtHR envisages its role as bringing 
about an ever-increasing human rights protection within the countries of the Council of 
Europe – what has been termed an expansionist approach.17  This ‘inflation’ of rights is 
                                                          
14 Colin Warbrick, ‘Economic and Social Interests in the European Convention on Human Rights’ in Mashood 
A Baderin and Robert McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford University 
Press 2007), p. 241. 
15 Tyrer v The United Kingdom (Application No. 5856/72) (Judgment of 25 April 1978), §31. 
16 Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 16 May 1978, Series A No. 32, at § 26. 
17 Tom Zwart, ‘More Human Rights than Court: Why the legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights is 
in need of repair and how it can be done’ in Spyridon Floaitis, Tom Zwart and Julie Fraser (eds.) The European 
Aoife Nannery 
particularly evident with regard to Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention18, which has 
been progressively expanded to encompass the protection of salaries, pensions and social 
security benefits, contributory and non-contributory. 19 
The points that I wish to extract from this literature for the purposes of my analysis are the 
following: only Protocols 1 and 2 to the Convention (concerning the protection of property 
and the right to education, respectively) are explicitly considered to be socio-economic 
rights.20 The drafting of the Convention deliberately omitted socio-economic rights from the 
purview of the Convention bodies, as that was intended to be the purpose of the Social Rights 
Charter. 
Rather, what has emerged through the case law and the reasoning of the ECtHR is that certain 
enumerated rights that are civil or political in nature may possess social or economic 
qualities. O’Cinneide states that Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment) and Article 8 (the right to private and family life) holds 
promise for applicants seeking protection from destitution and deprivation.21  Ellie Palmer 
has argued that Article 6 (right to a fair hearing) and Article 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination) may also serve to protect socio-economic rights in certain instances.22  
I adhere to this conception of Article 1 of Protocol 1 as a social right for the purposes of my 
analysis. While it has been suggested that “often the impetus to protect property as a human 
right is the desire of some to protect the status quo” and that property rights are conceived as 
“liberalist” and part of the “laissez-faire philosophy”23, the ECtHR has expanded upon this 
view, and views property also as “a redressing and restitutional-specific tool”.24  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Court of Human Rights and its Discontents: Turning Criticism into Strength (Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 
2013), p. 78. 
18 Article 1 of Protocol 1 states: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it 
deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment 
of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 
19 Ingrid Leijten, ‘From Stec to Valkov: Possessions and Margins in the Social Security Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 13 Human Rights Law Review 309.  
20 See Dragoljub Popović, Protecting Property in European Human Rights Law (Eleven International 
Publishing, 2009), p. 140. 
21 Colm O’Cinneide , ‘A modest proposal: destitution, state responsibility and the European  Convention on 
Human Rights’ E.H.R.L.R. 2008, 5, 583-605. See also Cassese, infra. No. 90.  
22 Ellie Palmer, ‘Protecting Socio-Economic Rights through the European Convention on Human Rights: Trends 
and Developments in the European Court of Human Rights’, Erasmus Law Review, Vol. 2(4) (2009). 
23 Deborah Rook, Property Law and Human Rights (Blackstone Press Limited, 2001), pp. 2-3. 
24Popović, Protecting Property in European Human Rights Law, p. 145. 
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The right to property under Article 1 of Protocol 1 possesses quite a wide scope, and 
“endorses a broad international legal concept of property comprising all ‘acquired’ rights that 
constitute assets”.25 It references both the ‘public interest’ and the ‘general interest’ when 
citing whether interferences with the right to property might be justified; a proportionality 
test of the rights of the individual against the common weal.26   The Court has previously held 
that the right to property under the Convention does not constitute a right to acquire 
possessions, but rather protects only existing possessions.27  
A significant facet of the ECtHR’s interpretation of the right to property under the 
Convention is the inclusion of social welfare benefits and pensions – not necessarily 
contributory - as possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol 1. These are 
traditionally conceived as social rights28, and would appear to indicate that the right to 
property is nested within the overall duty of states to ensure that vulnerable members of their 
societies are adequately protected from the vicissitudes of life. More specifically for the 
purposes of my analysis, as the cases that I examine concern a mixture of cuts to salaries, 
pensions and social welfare payments, the Court has also emphasised that “the principles 
which apply generally in cases concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 are equally relevant 
when it comes to salaries or welfare benefits (see, mutatis mutandis, Stummer v. Austria 
[GC], no. 37452/02, § 82, ECHR 2011)”.29 
 
1.2 Relevance to the European sovereign debt crisis 
How does this conception of socio-economic rights under the Convention relate to the cases 
under consideration? None of the social Euro-crisis cases significantly pushed the boundaries 
                                                          
25 ECtHR, Van Marle and Others v The Netherlands, App. No. 8543/79 et al (26/6/1986), §41 in Christoph 
Grabenwerter, European Convention on Human Rights Commentary (Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag 2014), p. 
367. 
26 Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White & Ovey: The European Convention on 
Human Rights (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2014), p. 493. 
27 Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, §50. 
28 See Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: “The States Parties to 
the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.”  
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf, accessed 12 March 2015. 
Also Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Social Security and Social 
Assistance: “1. The Union recognises and respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social  services  
providing  protection  in  cases  such  as  maternity,  illness,  industrial accidents,  dependency  or  old  age,  and  
in  the  case  of  loss  of  employment,  in accordance  with  the  rules  laid  down  by  Community  law  and  
national  laws  and practices.” The European Social Charter also protects the right to social security in Article 12 
– this is covered in Chapter III. 
29 Koufaki and ADEDY v Greece, App Nos 57665/12 and 57657/12 (ECtHR (decision) 7 May 2013), §32. 
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of what may have constituted a social right under the Convention; the jurisprudence of 
Article 1, Protocol 1 is firmly established in cases concerning pay cuts30, pensions31 and 
social welfare benefits.32  This is the question which I address in the section below. I believe 
that these cases demonstrate the most developed position of the ECtHR on the crossover 
between sovereign debt financing and social rights in the Euro-crisis context.  
 
2. The social Euro-crisis cases 
 
2.1 What is a social Euro-crisis case? 
For the purposes of this paper, I use the term ‘social Euro-crisis case’ as shorthand. ‘Social’ 
here refers to the nature of the rights at issue in the cases. The applicants primarily relied on 
Article 1 of Protocol 1, as well as the procedural guarantees in Article 6 and Article 14, the 
right to a fair trial and freedom from discrimination, respectively.  The ‘Euro-crisis’ element 
(also shorthand – of the respondent states in these cases, only Greece, Portugal and Latvia are 
Eurozone states. I therefore use this term as something of a catchall for the general push 
towards austerity politics as a result of the European sovereign debt crisis.) All of the states 
examined (Greece, Portugal, Hungary, Latvia and Romania) have been subject to 
macroeconomic surveillance of varying degrees and all have secured some kind of financial 
assistance – sourced from bilateral loans, international organisations such as the IMF, and 
Eurozone financial facilities such as the EFSF, the EFSM and the ESM – since the onset of 
the crisis. 
I arrange these cases along a spectrum to better illustrate the trends that they demonstrate. At 
one end of the spectrum are the Greek and Portuguese cases, where the greatest 
accumulations of factors that I discuss in this paper are to be found. The provisions 
challenged stem directly from national legal measures implementing some facet of an 
economic adjustment programme negotiated by Greece and Portugal by the troika.33 The 
Hungarian cases lie further along – while Hungary did seek loan assistance from the EU in 
                                                          
30 Paulet v The United Kingdom (Application No. 6219/08) (Judgment of 13 May 2014).  
31Carson  and  Others  v.  The United  Kingdom  (Application No. 42184/05) (Judgment of 16 March 2010). 
32 Béláné Nagy v Hungary (Application No. 53080/13) (Judgment of 10 February 2015 – appeal to Grand 
Chamber pending as of 1 June 2015.) 
33 The ‘troika’ of the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission is the most prominent and visible 
manifestation, but the cases examined do not exclusively stem from troika-imposed austerity measures; only 
Koufaki and Da Conceição Mateus challenge the Greek and Portuguese programmes. As will be seen in the rest 
of the cases, references to the economic crisis are more indirect. 
The ‘Conscience of Europe’ in the crisis 
 
17 
 
200834, this is not explicitly referenced in the judgment. In the Latvian and Romanian cases, 
the reference to the unfavourable budgetary situation in the country was the impetus for the 
contested measures, with the medium-term EU financial assistance granted to those states 
unmentioned.  Temporally, these cases run from 2010 to 2014 (from lodging of the 
application to the decision by the ECtHR). This is an area of law that is constantly developing 
and generating new challenges and jurisprudence; my selection is only a partial example.35 
2.2 The ‘bailout’ cases: Koufaki and ADEDY v. Greece, decision on the admissibility 
of 7 May 2013  
In 2010 the Greek Government adopted a series of austerity measures, including reductions in 
the remuneration, benefits, bonuses and retirement pensions of public servants, with a view to 
reducing public spending and in reaction to the economic and financial crisis the country was 
experiencing. In July 2010 the applicants took the matter before the Greek Supreme 
Administrative Court: the first applicant applied to the court to annul her pay-slip; the second 
applicant – the Public Service Trade Union Confederation – sought judicial review because 
of the detrimental effect of the measures on the financial situation of its members. On 20 
February 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applications.36  
Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicants complained that the cuts in wages and 
pensions resulting from Greek Laws nos. 3833/2010, 3845/2010 and 3847/2010 amounted to 
a deprivation of possessions. The second applicant also alleged violations of Articles 6 § 1, 8, 
13, 14 and 17 of the Convention based on the detrimental effect of the measures on the 
financial situation of its members. 37 The Court opted to join the cases of the first and second 
applicants, having regard to the similarity between the cases both in terms of facts and in the 
substantive issues that they raised.38 
                                                          
34 Council Decision (2009/102/EC)of 4 November 2008 providing Community medium-term financial 
assistance to Hungary. 
35 For another account of some of the cases which have come before Strasbourg as a result of the crisis, see 
Lorenza Mola, ‘The Margin of Appreciation accorded to States in times of economic crisis: an analysis of the 
decision by the European Committee of Social Rights and by the European Court of Human Rights on national 
austerity measures’ (2015) 5 Lex Social: Revista de Derechos Sociales 174. 
36 Information Note on the Court’s case law No. 163, Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece (dec.) -
 57665/12 and 57657/12, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=002-7627, accessed 
17.02.2015. 
37 Koufaki and ADEDY v Greece, App Nos 57665/12 and 57657/12 (ECtHR (decision) 7 May 2013), §20. 
38 Koufaki, §29. 
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That a salary is considered to be within the meaning of ‘possessions’ as contained in the first 
paragraph of Article 1, Protocol 1 is well-established in ECtHR case law.39 The Court held 
that the reductions in Ms. Koufaki’s salary should not be considered as a “deprivation of  
possessions” as was claimed by the applicants,  but rather as interference with the right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions for the purposes of the first sentence of the first paragraph 
of  Article 1 of Protocol No.1.40 It then proceeded with its test of whether the interference 
could be said to have been contrary to the Convention; whether the measure was legal, and 
necessary (whether the specific measure taken was justified or whether other measures were 
available which would have had a less severe effect on the applicant.) If an interference with 
the applicant’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol 1 was found to exist, the third stage of the 
analysis would consider whether the interference was proportionate. 
As the deductions in salary had been authorised by Laws nos. 3833/2010 and 3845/2010, the 
ECtHR held that the first element of the test had been satisfied.41 
In the second stage the Court considered whether the interference was justified, assessing the 
public interest of the measures in question.  The Court attached “particular weight” to the 
report submitted by the Greek Government which accompanied Law 3383/2010, as well as to 
the reasoning of the Greek Supreme Administrative Court.42 The report refers to the 
“exceptional circumstances without precedent in recent Greek history”: ‘“this was the worst 
crisis in the public finances for decades” which “[had] undermined the country’s credibility, 
thwarted efforts to meet the country’s lending needs and pose[d] a serious threat to the 
national economy”’.  
The report went on to state that finding a way out of the crisis represented “a historic 
responsibility and a national duty” and that Greece had undertaken to “achieve fiscal 
consolidation on the basis of precise targets and a precise timetable”.43 It might be noted at 
this point that the ECtHR hews quite closely to the decision of the Greek Supreme 
Administrative Court, a point which is discussed in the analysis of the cases below.    
The pay cuts imposed upon Ms Koufaki were part of a wider effort to restore stability to the 
economy as a whole. This included combating tax evasion, opening up formerly closed 
                                                          
39 In this regard, the Court cited the previous decision of Stummer v. Austria  [GC], no. 37452/02, §  82, ECHR 
2011 at §32. 
40 Koufaki, §34. 
41 Ibid, §45. 
42Ibid, §36. 
43Ibid, §37.  
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professions and reforming social security and retirement systems, leading the ECtHR to 
consider that the totality of the measures enacted indicated that the legislature was acting in 
the public interest.44 
The Court took note of the applicant’s submission that her net salary fell from EUR 2,435.83 
to EUR 1,885.79 as a result of Laws nos. 3833/2010 and 3845/2010, and of administrative 
decision adopted under Law no. 4024/201145, but does not regard this as a breach of Article 1 
of Protocol 1, as Ms. Koufaki’s salary was not reduced to such an extent so as to render her 
unable to provide for herself. This, combined with the precarious state of Greece’s finances, 
led the Court to find that an excessive burden had not been placed on the first applicant. 
Françoise Tulkens maintains, in her analysis of the Koufaki case, that “a fair balance had 
been struck”46 (Judge Tulkens does not elaborate further on this.)  
The ECtHR has held on previous occasions that the right to property does not include the 
right to a salary of a fixed amount.47  The Court has always taken a cautious stance and 
afforded states a wide margin of appreciation in matters of social and economic policy: 
“provided that the legislature remains within the bounds of its margin of appreciation, it is not 
for the Court to say whether the legislation represented the best solution for dealing with the 
problem or whether the legislature’s discretion should have been exercised in another way.”48 
Predictably, the precariousness of Greece’s financial position is to the forefront of the Court’s 
reasoning. The macroeconomic instability of the Eurozone negated any meaningful balancing 
of the rights of the applicant against the measures of the Greek state; once it was established 
that Ms. Koufaki was not at risk of destitution, no more appears to be required by the ECtHR 
but to defer to the agreement between Greece and its creditors, and to the decision of the 
national court. As to whether the impugned measures were proportionate or not, such 
analyses are usually considered by the Chamber, while Koufaki was declared inadmissible on 
the grounds of being ‘manifestly ill-founded.’ 
The link between the economic adjustment programme and the measure complained of is 
manifestly clear: the reference to the Memoranda of Understanding conclude/ed between the 
                                                          
44Ibid, §41. 
45Ibid, §45. 
46 Tulkens,‘The contribution of the European Convention on Human Rights to the poverty issue in times of 
crisis’, p. 5. 
47 Panfile v. Romania, (Application No. 13902/11), (Judgment of 20 March 2012), §18. 
48 Koufaki, para 48. 
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Greek government and its international creditors is explicitly referenced by the Court.49 The 
reference to the crisis representing the greatest challenge to the Greek state in ‘recent’ history 
is particularly interesting. Can the potential collapse of the Eurozone banking system (widely 
predicted be an inevitable consequence of the failure of over-exposed Greek banks to obtain 
credit on international markets and meet repayments, leading to their collapse and the spread 
of contagion in the wider Eurozone) be compared to some of the other crises faced by Greece 
in its past? Can the sovereign debt crisis be equated to the transition of Greece from 
dictatorship to democracy in the 1970s (which the ECtHR has also had cause to consider – 
and which it did not cite in Koufaki?)50  
The reference to the dire circumstances and the reference to exceptional circumstances recur 
in other cases in this section. What such an approach may represent for the interpretation of 
the ECtHR and how the Court perceives of its role in defending socio-economic rights in 
times of crisis is something I discuss below.  
Da Conceição Mateus v. Portugal and Santos Januário v. Portugal, decision of 8 
October 2013 
The applicants were pensioners affiliated to Portugal’s state pension scheme and asked the 
Court to rule that the cuts imposed on certain pension entitlements (holiday and Christmas 
bonuses) enacted as part of austerity measures under the State Budget Act 2012 were a 
violation of their rights under the Convention. As the application did not invoke any 
particular provision under the Convention, the Court decided that interference of the 
applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions under Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 was the appropriate basis.  
The Portuguese Constitutional Court had previously found the cuts at issue to be 
unconstitutional, on the basis that they violated the principle of ‘proportional equality’51 – the 
cuts to public sector employees were unconstitutional as no similar measures were levied 
upon employees in the private sector. Important as regards the admissibility of the case to the 
ECtHR was the invocation of the Portuguese CC of Article 282 (4) of the Portuguese 
constitution, permitting the effects of a finding of unconstitutionality to be restricted in 
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exceptional circumstances.52 This ruled the measures unconstitutional under Portuguese law, 
but such a finding would have forced the executive to redraft the national budget and develop 
substantial alternative measures at very short notice. The Portuguese Constitutional Court 
therefore delayed its finding of unconstitutionality for one year, enabling the applicants to 
successfully claim that they had exhausted their domestic remedies. 
The Portuguese Constitutional Court had emphasised that such differences in treatment 
between private and public sector employees could not be justified, even to reduce the public 
deficit to the level specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, citing the existence of 
alternative measures to achieve the required reduction in spending in both the spending and 
revenue streams.53 
As was held in Koufaki with regard to the subsistence threshold, the ECtHR in this case 
analogously held that in order for an infringement to have occurred, the “essence of the right” 
must have been infringed.54 The Court then stressed that the nature of the benefit taken away 
is also to be taken into account – whether the benefit may have been a particularly 
advantageous one, extended to only certain groups of individuals.55 The ECtHR took into 
consideration that the basic pension entitlement amount was unchanged, and limited to three 
years, thus limiting the measures in both temporal and quantitative terms.56 
Particularly evocative language is used by the Court when describing the loan assistance 
programme that was in operation in Portugal at that time: “The very fact that a programme of 
such magnitude had to be put in place shows that the economic crisis which was asphyxiating 
the Portuguese economy at the material time and its effect on the State budget balance were 
exceptional in nature, as the Constitutional Court indeed recognised in its decision of 5 July 
2012.”57 
“As  it  recently  did  in  similar  circumstances  relating  to  austerity measures adopted in 
Greece (see Koufaki and ADEDY, cited above, § 41), the Court considers that the cuts in 
social security benefits provided by the 2012 State Budget Act were clearly in the public 
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interest within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Like in Greece, these measures 
were adopted in an extreme economic situation, but unlike in Greece, they were transitory.”58 
It is puzzling that the ECtHR sought to emphasise the temporary nature of the Portuguese 
cuts when assessing whether they represented an infringement of the applicants’ property 
rights, as opposed to the permanent Greek cuts, when the Greek cuts themselves were not 
held to be disproportionate.59  
In a decision similar to the one handed down in Koufaki, the ECtHR held that the applicants 
were not made to bear an “excessive and disproportionate burden”, and ruled the complaint 
inadmissible by reason of being manifestly ill-founded.60 
2.3 Confiscatory tax and unemployment protection: N.K.M. v. Hungary, judgment 
of 14 May 2013 and R.Sz. v Hungary, judgment of 2 July 2013 
These two cases share an almost identical fact pattern. While not directly concerned with 
‘bailout’ measures, like the two previous cases, they are illustrative of certain parameters that 
Strasbourg remains within, even when the necessity of cuts in difficult economic 
circumstances is cited by the national authorities.  
N.K.M. concerned a civil servant who complained, in particular, that the imposition of a 98 
per cent tax on part of her severance pay under a legislation which entered into force ten 
weeks before her dismissal had amounted to an unjustified deprivation of property.61 In R.Sz, 
the applicant was subject to the same tax as the applicant in N.K.M., but it was implemented 
after he had left his job, at which point he had already spent the money that had served as his 
severance payment and which was now to be subject to a 98% tax.62 Much of the same logic 
and reasoning from the N.K.M judgment is also present in R.Sz.  
The Hungarian Parliament adopted the Tax Act introducing a new tax on certain payments to 
public sector employees whose employment had been terminated. The aim of the Tax Act 
was to fight against excessive severance payments in order to satisfy society’s sense of justice 
and protect the public purse at a time of economic hardship. The justifying measure cited in 
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support of this was the European Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC on curbing 
excessive payments in the financial sector.63 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court pointed out that it reviewed the rate or amount of taxes 
only exceptionally.64 However, it held that a pecuniary burden was unconstitutional if it was 
of a confiscatory nature or its extent was clearly exaggerated, i.e. was disproportionate and 
unjustified. 
The Hungarian government submitted that the rate of tax imposed had not placed an 
excessive individual burden upon the applicants or endangered their subsistence.65 The 
Hungarian Constitutional Court was not convinced of the link between the tax on the 
severance payment and the “public interest” criterion presented by the Hungarian 
Government:  
“The  Court  has  no  convincing  evidence  on which  to  conclude  that  the  reasons  referred  
to  by  the  Government  were manifestly devoid of any reasonable basis...However,  serious  
doubts  remain  as  to  the  relevance  of  these considerations in regard to the applicant who 
only received a statutorily due compensation  and  could  not  have  been  made  responsible  
for  the  fiscal problems which the State intended to remedy”.66 
The taxing of severance pay to the tune of 98% is drastic, even with the proclaimed goal of 
the Hungarian Government being both to “satisfy society’s sense of justice and of protecting 
the public purse”67 (even though the tax was levied on, or deducted from, the revenues 
concerned even if their morally doubtful origin could not be established.68) It is worth 
remembering that there had been a struggle in the Hungarian courts over such cases, with the 
Hungarian Parliament stripping the Constitutional Court of much of its power to adjudicate 
on certain issues, including tax policy. This appears to have exercised influence over 
Strasbourg’s reasoning, with the Court stating it could not ‘overlook the legislative process 
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leading to the enactment of the law affecting the applicant.’69 The relationship between the 
ECtHR and national courts is discussed below in the analysis of the cases.  
Some of the commentary on N.K.M emphasises the lengthy reflections that the ECtHR 
undertook in this case in relation to the lawfulness and public interest criteria when the case 
came to Strasbourg70 – given that taxation is very much a national prerogative. The ECtHR, 
while navigating through the delicate process of national taxation policy, does however state 
that “[it] cannot abdicate its power of review”.71   
Almost identical observations from the Hungarian Constitutional Court were cited in the 
ECtHR judgments, with the trespass into national taxation policy regarded in light of the role 
of the ECtHR as an external check on the ruling political majority.72 The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court noted that the stated purpose of the tax in question was to alleviate 
society’s sense of outrage at the excessive payments in the financial sector, given the role 
played by the financial sector in the global crisis of 2008.73 The ECtHR was not convinced by 
this line of argument; “For the Court, excessive risk-taking in the financial sector is irrelevant 
for civil servants who operate in a regulated environment of subordination.”74 
Both the national court and the ECtHR noted that the claim made by the Hungarian 
Government was not only intended to affect incomes earned contra bonos mores, but also to 
unconditional statutory entitlements, which could not be considered to have been earned 
contra bonos mores.75 An indication that both courts were not, in fact, impinging on the right 
of the executive to tax income, but rather that the impugned measure was confiscatory and 
punitive, and failed on those grounds.76  
The lack of “specific and compelling reasons” given as justification for the measures appears 
to have played a decisive role, and the fact that the measures purported to serve “social 
justice” did not justify the disproportionate impact upon the applicant: “it affected the 
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70 See the post by Ingrid Leijten, ‘N.K.M. v Hungary: Heavy Tax Burden Makes Strasbourg Step In’ at 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/06/10/n-k-m-v-hungary-heavy-tax-burden-makes-strasbourg-step-in/, last 
accessed 19.02.2015. 
71 N.K.M. v Hungary, §61. 
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applicant (and other dismissed civil servants in a similar situation) being in good-faith 
standing and deprived her of the larger part of a statutorily guaranteed, acquired right serving 
the special social interest of reintegration”.77 This is curiously formulated; it may be a 
restatement of the Court’s long held position that, despite the broad margin of appreciation 
afforded to states in matters of taxation and social policy, such measures will nevertheless be 
found to be disproportionate if they are “manifestly without reasonable foundation”.78  
This alone would have given the ECtHR cause to rule in favour of the applicants.79 Aside 
from the foray into national taxation policy, the ECtHR also referenced Article 34 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, on social security and social assistance.80 The ECtHR cited 
this to support the point that the applicants had suffered at a time of personal insecurity, while 
unemployed, and continued by stating that they  “was made to bear an excessive and 
disproportionate burden, while other civil servants with comparable statutory and other 
benefits were apparently not required to contribute to a comparable extent to the public 
burden, even if they were in the position of leadership that enabled them to define certain 
contractual benefits potentially disapproved by the public”.81  
The Court placed a particular emphasis on the burden that the applicants in both cases were 
made to bear, and the particular weight accorded to the role of redundancy pay – to act as a 
safety net to those made unemployed and to serve the specific and recognised social goal of 
labour reintegration. As Lavrysens has noted, this emphasis, together with the invocation of 
the social assistance provision of the CFREU, may signal the willingness of at least some of 
the Strasbourg bench to countenance the link between property protection and social rights 
(Lavrysen advocates that the right to property be instrumentalised – invoked in order to 
protected other affected rights – in order to ensure that provides the highest possible 
protection to socio-economic interests.82)  
This is a point unique to the Hungarian social Euro-crisis cases – as none of the applicants in 
the other cases were at risk of being made unemployed, N.K.M. and R.Sz. represent an 
interesting perspective from Strasbourg on the hardships of unemployment; an emblematic 
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issue of the European crisis, and one which is explored in the decisions of the European 
Committee on Social Rights in Chapter III.    
It also represents a good example of what the ECtHR might consider to be the limits of 
executive power in the European sovereign debt crisis. The measures have to be of unsound 
legal basis83, pursue an aim that is not remotely connected to the impugned measure, and 
place such a heavy burden upon a person, or a class of people that can be adequately balanced 
against the public interest. This is, it must be said, quite a low threshold.  
2.4 Welfare payments: Sulcs v Latvia, decision of 6 December 2011 
Sulcs84 concerned changes to the Law on Maternity and Sickness Insurance, as part of a 
greater drive to reduce public spending. Latvia had received EU medium-term financial 
assistance85 (although the case makes no explicit mention of this.) It had been the case that 
parental benefit was allocated to socially insured persons who either did not gain income 
because s/he was on parental leave or, on the contrary, did not use the parental leave and 
continued working. This benefit was paid until the child turned one.86 The Parliament of 
Latvia introduced changes to this legislation in June 2009, deleting the provision whereby the 
parent who was not on parental leave, but continued working, was still entitled to the 
benefit.87  
 All of the applicants’ children were born between December 2008 and June 2009, except for 
three, who were born shortly afterwards.88 The applicants argued before the Latvian 
Constitutional Court that they were entitled, on the basis of legitimate expectations when they 
had planned their families, to the full amount of parental benefit until their child turned one. 
The Constitutional Court upheld the legislation.89   
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In their complaint to the ECtHR, the applicants complained that the legislature had failed to 
allow a sufficient transitional period for the amendment to the amount of parental benefit.90 
The ECtHR found no issue with the legality of the measure91, and found that balancing the 
budget constituted a legitimate aim.92 The Court went on to hold that the measure was 
proportionate as the benefit had only been reduced by 50%, and not removed entirely, as well 
as noting that the applicants still had the choice of accepting either the parental benefit or the 
monthly wage.93 
This case appears rather cut and dried, but it is disappointing that Strasbourg declined to 
consider the legitimate expectations point raised by the applicants whose children were born 
after the deadline was passed. Legitimate expectations to benefits and payments previously 
enjoyed may prove to be a significant issue as social security systems across Europe are 
adjusted to account for reductions in government spending. As discussed in the analysis of 
the cases below, the ECtHR’s admissibility procedure and procedural rights in times of crisis 
means that the result in Sulcs is somewhat difficult to reconcile with other social security 
cases, where the Court demonstrates a more robust examination of government cuts.94  
2.5 Frimu and four other applications v Romania, decision of 7 February 2012, 
Dumitru and others v Romania, decision of 4 September 2012. 
The cases of the civil servants in Frimu, and the retired judges in Dumitru were primarily 
concerned with perceived violations of Article 6 and Article 14 ECHR – the right to a fair 
trial and the right to freedom from discrimination, respectively (although Dumitru also 
contested that the impugned measure violated his right to property under Article 1 of Protocol 
1.95) Romania was the recipient of precautionary medium-term financial assistance in 201196, 
although this is not specifically referenced in the ECtHR decision. 
In Frimu, the applicants, retired court officials, objected to the recalculation of their pension 
payments, which saw their overall pension reduced by eliminating the state-funded non-
contributory portion from the total.97 The applicants alleged that the cuts jeopardised their 
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prospects of maintaining an adequate standard of living, as it represented more than half of 
the pension payment (the issue of subsistence makes another appearance here.98) The 
applicants relied on other previous judgments in Romania which had ruled in favour of 
applicants in very similar situations to their own. 
The Romanian Constitutional Court found the measures to be constitutional, as only the non-
contributory portion of the pension had been taken away, that the amount remaining after 
deduction was higher than average under the scheme and that it was higher than the statutory 
pension.99 The applicants appealed to the ECtHR on the grounds that the Romanian courts 
had upheld claims identical to their own on previous occasions.  
The ECtHR considered whether the divergences in the results of the cases taken against this 
revised pension scheme represented an infringement of the right to a fair hearing and 
constituted discriminatory practice. It noted that conflicting lines of case law could take time 
to resolve, and did not necessarily constitute a breach of legal certainty. It also noted that the 
applicants had been able to benefit from adversarial proceedings and present evidence 
freely.100 
It considered that the case at issue did not constitute a departure from the practice adopted in 
similar cases, but was, rather, the result of statutory provisions being applied to differing sets 
of circumstances.101 
Dumitru involved an application by retired judges contesting the decision to stagger various 
bonuses and payments awarded to them in proceedings. These amounts were to be paid in 
instalments and were indexed for inflation. There was an extended battle in the Romanian 
courts over whether the use of this particular device was justifiable, as under the Romanian 
Constitution it was to be reserved for “extraordinary situations”102 – the recurrent reference to 
the exceptional circumstances which the economic crisis represented. The measure was found 
to be constitutional.103 
The ECtHR noted that despite changes to the instalment payments, the Romanian authorities 
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had nevertheless complied with them, and that there was nothing in the case file to suggest 
that the authorities did not intend to carry this out fully.104 
Articles 6 and 14, as procedural rights, grant an interesting perspective on property claims 
before the ECtHR. They are particularly important in the context of the crisis, where a 
frenetic atmosphere of emergency measures may lead to such rights being viewed as 
dispensable. In the context of human rights adjudication generally and the ECtHR in 
particular, Brems and Lavrysens have noted that human rights bodies ought to have regard to 
procedural justice in the cases before them, regardless of the impact upon their legitimacy, 
simply because it is part of the value system they represent.105 They also cite studies 
indicating that it is the client’s perception of whether a trial was indeed fair that determines 
whether they regard the court as legitimate, not necessarily the outcome of the case.106 This is 
an important factor to bear in mind, as crises can often result in the sidelining of procedural 
safeguards.107 
3 Conclusions: what salient points can be derived from these cases? 
 
3.1 The perceived severity of the crisis. 
The language used by the ECtHR to emphasise the severity of the crisis is striking; the 
domestic situation is described as “an exceptional crisis without precedent in recent Greek 
history”.108 Referring to the Greek crisis in Koufaki, Strasbourg cites at length a report which 
accompanied Law no. 3833/2010 (it is not stated in the decision who the authors of the report 
are), stating that ‘finding a way out of the crisis represented “a historic responsibility and a 
national duty”’.109 
 In Da Conceição Mateus, the Court stated “The very fact that a programme of such 
magnitude had to be put in place shows that the economic crisis which was asphyxiating the 
Portuguese economy at the material time and its effect on the State budget balance were 
                                                          
104 Press Release Dumitru and others v Romania (Application No. 57265/08), p. 2. 
105 Eva Brems and Laurens Lavrysen, ‘Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: The European Court 
of Human Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, 35(1), February 2013, p. 185. 
106 Ibid, p. 177. 
107 For examples of some of the trends marking the passing of crisis measures in certain European states, see 
Stephen Coutts, Leticia Díez Sánchez, Afroditi Marketou and Leonardo Pierdominici, ‘Legal Manifestations of 
the Emergency in National Euro-crisis Law’ EUI Working Paper 2015/14. 
108 Koufaki v Greece, §37. 
109 Koufaki v Greece, §37. 
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exceptional in nature”.110 
The link to the economic crisis becomes more attenuated in the Hungarian cases and the 
Latvian and Romanian cases, where the crisis is referenced more obliquely; the need for 
particular measures as a means of tackling the crisis is either rejected by the ECtHR as 
illegitimate or disproportionate to the ends sought (N.K.M. v Hungary, R.Sz v Hungary),  
accepted as being within the state’s margin of appreciation (Sulcs v Latvia), or is woven into 
the arguments on the need to pursue particular policies (Frimu v Romania and Dumitru v 
Romania.) Tackling the crisis remains as a powerful driver of policy, albeit in different 
forms. How and when the ECtHR chooses to involve itself in crises is interesting from the 
perspective of the two other themes which I consider in the next chapter: cases concerning 
financial stability and cases on emergency and ‘exceptional circumstances’.  
Compared to the noticeably high levels of deference to the exigencies of the European 
sovereign debt crisis, these lines of case law in Chapter II demonstrate that the ECtHR has 
previously intervened and set a rigorous standard for states in instances of uncertainty; 
trespassing onto traditionally sacrosanct national prerogatives when protected Convention 
rights are impinged upon. I accredit the more deferential stance of the ECtHR in the social 
Euro-crisis cases to the scope of the European sovereign debt crisis, although the causes for 
such a position are likely to be varied and complex. It has been submitted that the political 
and economic necessity of keeping the banking system in Eurozone states from collapsing 
represented an imperative objective for the governments of Europe, as well as the European 
Union bodies.111 
3.2 Reference to the subsistence threshold and the proportionality analysis. 
The subsistence threshold appears as part of the ECtHR’s consideration of whether a 
measure, if legal and necessary, can be said to be proportionate to achieve the stated ends.   
The most developed iterations of the term ‘subsistence’ stem from the case law under Article 
3 ECHR – the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading punishment.112 Many of the 
cases heard by Strasbourg on the question of inhuman or degrading treatment concern those 
individuals in vulnerable situations who have an especially close relationship with the state: 
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prisoners in police custody113 and asylum seekers114, for example. Attempts have been made 
to extend the protection of Article 3 to socio-economic conditions.115 In Cassese’s account of 
the Van Volsem case116, a mother of two children alleged that the cutting off of electricity to 
her home represented inhuman and degrading punishment. Cassese acknowledges that the 
issue is a complex one; evaluating whether measures bearing on social rights and the daily 
living conditions of a person may amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.117 From the 
cases Cassese considers, it would appear that the ECtHR interprets such situations on a case 
by case basis. 
 
This issue is pertinent to the social Euro-crisis cases as regards the sufficiency of the 
justification of the measures implemented by the national governments and allowed by the 
ECtHR. If the issue is that none of the applicants in the above cases fell below the threshold 
of Article 3 (which is indeed a very low one, encompassing the most basic human needs of 
shelter and sustenance118), then this would appear to be rather ill-fitting when considering 
cases concerning the protection of property.  
Where the subsistence threshold was alluded to by the Court, none of the applicants were 
deemed to have fallen below such a threshold. There is also little guidance in cases like Van 
Volsem on what precisely such a test might look like, making it a difficult situation for both 
the applicant and the Court to assess.119 Da Conceição Mateus offers some direction on this 
point. 
The ECtHR stressed that the situation of the applicants in Koufaki and Da Conceição Mateus 
has not “fall[en] below the subsistence threshold”120 or “impaired the essence of the right”, 
but that the measure challenged represented a “reasonable and commensurate reduction” 121 – 
evidently not caught by A1P1.  
Of particular interest in Da Conceição Mateus is that, whenever “subsistence” is mentioned, 
                                                          
113 Selmouni v France (Application No. 25803/94) (Judgment of 28 July 1999).  
114 N v UK, (Application. No. 26565/05) (Judgment of 27 May 2008).  
115 Antonio Cassese, ‘Can the Notion of Inhuman and Degrading Treatment be Applied to Socio-Economic 
Conditions?’ in The Human Rights Dimensions of International Law: Selected Papers of Antonio Cassese, 
(Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012), pp. 335-337. 
116 Francine van Volsem v. Belgium (decision of 9 May 1990, Application No. 14641/89). 
117 Cassese, ‘Can the Notion of Inhuman and Degrading Treatment be Applied to Socio-Economic Conditions?’, 
p. 335. 
118 Ibid, p. 336. 
119 Ibid, p. 337. 
120 Koufaki, §44. 
121 Da Conceição Mateus, §24. 
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very often it refers to the financial subsistence of the Portuguese State. If the subsistence of 
the state is at issue (and indeed, what this even means in this context is not clear) then it begs 
the question whether even a complete deprivation of the benefit in question (pension 
bonuses) would represent a disproportionate response to such a threat.   
The Hungarian cases – always an interesting counterpoint in this discussion, as Strasbourg 
found for the applicants – grant an insightful perspective on the subsistence question. While 
the fact that the reduction in the severance payment (98%) could not be said to be a 
reasonable and commensurate reduction, the ECtHR also highlighted the nature of the benefit 
– that severance payments are intended to support individuals at times of uncertainty (job 
loss), and reintegration into the labour force.122 This indicates a more nuanced approach than 
the Greek and Portuguese cases, where the Court emphasised that the applicants, even when 
the cuts were made, still found themselves in relatively privileged positions, and were not in 
danger of falling into destitution. It would appear that the type of benefit targeted by the state 
may play a role in influencing how Strasbourg assesses the proportionality of the measure, 
with those more fundamental payments deserving of greater levels of protection, with 
benefits connected to redundancy and labour reintegration afforded a high degree of 
protection.  
In a slightly different guise, this concept of subsistence can also be observed in Sulcs, where 
the ECtHR considered legitimate expectations to a benefit of a particular amount. The finding 
of the ECtHR in Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland123 that Article 1 of Protocol 1 cannot be 
interpreted as guaranteeing a pension of a certain amount was mentioned by the Court in 
Sulcs.124 Whether the legitimate expectation to a benefit can be linked to the applicant falling 
below a certain threshold in living standards is an interesting question that I do not propose to 
untangle in this thesis; but it is nevertheless important to have regard to the fact that similar 
issues can arise in somewhat different guises in the cases.  
Echoes are also present in Frimu, with the applicants arguing that the quotient of their 
pension that had been eliminated placed them below the subsistence level. This was not 
specifically addressed by the ECtHR, as the reasoning in the case was fixed more on the fact 
that the reason for the differing verdicts in similar cases was due to differences of fact, rather 
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than a difference in the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions by the Romanian 
courts. 
The proportionality analysis 
As all of the social Euro crisis cases with the exception of the Hungarian cases (N.K.M. v 
Hungary and R.Sz. v Hungary) are admissibility decisions, it must be borne in mind that a 
substantial proportionality analysis was not engaged in by the Court.  
Commenting on Koufaki and Da Conceição Mateus, Goldmann observes that: “Conflicting 
international obligations may not claim primacy over human rights obligations, but they 
might have an impact on the application of the proportionality principle, since they define the 
goals of the measures that need to be justified as proportional.”125 
The difficulty in this instance is that very little balancing of the rights of the property rights of 
the applicants against the financial stability of the respondent states actually occurs.  The 
reasoning of the Court would appear to indicate that such is the gravity of the situation, that 
any measures required to tackle the crisis threatening to engulf the Greek and Portuguese 
economies would be found to be proportionate. This raises broader issues with respect to the 
suitability of the proportionality test as a means of protecting human rights in times of 
crisis.126  
In N.K.M. v Hungary and R.Sz. v Hungary, it would appear that it was the questionable 
legality and necessity of the measures which led the Court to find for the applicants, with the 
proportionality of the measures secondary.127  
I pick up this thread in the next chapter; an insight into how the ECtHR uses proportionality 
in other crisis situations is helpful when assessing whether the social Euro crisis cases 
represent a departure from established positions. 
3.3 The relationship between Strasbourg and national constitutional courts. 
The relationship between Strasbourg and the supreme and constitutional courts of Europe is a 
topic which falls outside the remit of this paper. It is interesting to note how the economic 
                                                          
125 M Goldmann, ‘Human Rights and Sovereign Debt Workouts’ in Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky and Jernej Letnar 
Černič (eds), Making Sovereign Financing and Human Rights Work (Hart 2014), p. 91. 
126 Stavros Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?’ 09/08 Jean Monnet Working Paper 
Series, NYU School of Law. For an example of the problems inherent in using proportionality as a tool to 
protect social rights in times of economic crisis, see the debate in the International Journal of Constitutional 
Law between Contiades and Fotiadou, and Bilchitz. 
127 N.K.M. v Hungary, §47. Although in R.Sz. v Hungary, the question of the legality and constitutionality of the 
measures were also considered under the proportionality principle - § 54-57. 
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crisis may throw light on the national and supranational judicial relationship. The ECtHR 
hewed quite closely to the findings of the national constitutional courts in all of the cases 
above, with interesting divergences on occasion.  
In Koufaki, Strasbourg adheres almost entirely to the finding of the Greek Supreme 
Administrative Court. This is not the case, however, in Da Conceição Mateus, where the 
ECtHR is more selective in choosing which of the Portuguese Constitutional Court’s 
arguments to adopt in deciding on the admissibility of the claims.  
Unlike in Koufaki, where Strasbourg appeared to defer entirely to the findings of the national 
court (or, more appropriately, to the report accompanying the law implementing the contested 
measures), here Strasbourg picks and chooses among the Portuguese Court’s arguments when 
formulating its own conclusions. In Koufaki, the applicant submitted that the proportionality 
of the paycuts should have taken into account the rise in the cost of living and basic 
necessities.128 This was not alluded to by the ECtHR in considering the subsistence level in 
its proportionality analysis. In contrast, the Portuguese Constitutional Court factored the 
increase in the cost of living, and the rise of inflation into its decision that the measures 
disproportionately affected public sector workers.129  
In the Hungarian cases, there is an interesting dynamic at play. The embattled position of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court is alluded to at the beginning of the judgment130, and it may 
be the case that there was international judicial solidarity at work in this instance.131 The 
nervousness of the Court in ruling on such a sensitive domestic issue as taxation is evident in 
the concurring opinion of Judge Lorenzen joined by Judges Raimondi and Jočiene. The 
judges allude to their hesitation in finding a violation, but were moved by what “was for me 
to a considerable extent justified by the very peculiar way this tax legislation was introduced 
and applied in a case like the applicant’s.”132 
 
 
                                                          
128 Koufaki, §26. 
129 Decision of the Constitutional Court of 5 July 2012 (No. 353/2012) cited in Da Conceição Mateus,ibid, §4. 
130 R.Sz. v Hungary, §13. N.K.M. v Hungary, §14. 
131 The Hungarian legal system has been described as being beset by a hostile political class, which may make 
judicial support from the supranational level more important. International legal bodies such as the ECtHR have 
handed down judgments condemning the actions of the Hungarian state, these are reputed to have had little 
impact upon domestic policy and the legislative process. See Kriszta Kovás and Gábor Attila Tóth, ‘Hungary’s 
Constitutional Transformation’ (2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Review 183, p. 202. 
132 N.K.M. v Hungary, Concurring Opinion of Judge Lorenzen joined by Judges Raimondi and Jočiene. 
The ‘Conscience of Europe’ in the crisis 
 
35 
 
3.4 The admissibility of the decisions and Strasbourg’s case management strategy. 
Admissibility claims are decided either by a Committee of three judges133, voting 
unanimously, or else the relevant Chamber.134  Committee cases represent more than 90% of 
all applications lodged with the Court. These are cases found inadmissible as they are deemed 
to be manifestly ill-founded or do not fulfil one of the conditions of admissibility prescribed 
by Article 35. Sorting through these applications is time-consuming, despite their reduced 
importance. As a consequence, there is little time to deal adequately with “chamber cases”, 
that is cases that will lead to a decision on the admissibility or a judgment.135 As has been 
noted with concern in the literature, Article 30 of the Convention, as inserted by Protocol 11, 
allows for the Committee or the Chamber to decide whether to relinquish the case to the 
Grand Chamber. 136 
A brief mention of the use of the ‘manifestly ill-founded’ criterion to dismiss cases perceived 
as being unmeritorious; there have been criticisms of the ECtHR’s use of ‘manifestly ill-
founded’, chief among them that the Court does not give reasons for its decisions when 
declaring the claims inadmissible, which, the argument goes, may detract from its 
legitimacy.137 
Koufaki, Da Conceição Mateus, Sulcs, Frimu, and Dumitru were all138, like ninety per cent of 
the cases which come before the ECtHR, declared inadmissible on the grounds of being 
‘manifestly ill-founded.’ This raises the obvious problem that the consideration of the issues 
was inevitably treated more cursorily than would have been the case had the case progressed 
to the Chamber. Singly, cases like Sulcs and Frimu and Dumitru may not raise alarm bells. 
The crisis threatening to engulf European economies and the perceived need for fiscal 
tightening, together with the need for the ECtHR to resort to measures to expedite its 
crippling case load and the relatively privileged position of the applicants in question may 
                                                          
133 Article 28 ECHR. 
134 Article 29 ECHR. 
135 Virginia Mantouvalou and Panayotis Voyatzis, ‘The Council of Europe and the Protection of Human Rights: 
A System in Need of Reform’ [2008] Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law, Joseph, 
McBeth, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming 
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tempt a dismissal of the issues. Where this becomes worrying, however, is when a similar 
fact pattern can be deduced across multiple cases arising out of similar domestic 
circumstances, and still be summarily dismissed by the ECtHR as inconsequential. The 
collective weight and similarity of these cases ought to indicate that there is cause for concern 
with the persistent issues in these circumstances. 
3.5 What do the social Euro-crisis cases represent?  
The interaction between sovereign debt loan assistance programmes, austerity and the 
protection of fundamental rights, in particular socio-economic rights, has been discussed in 
the literature139, as well as by other human rights bodies.140 It is important to stress that a 
socio-economic right may not be considered to have been infringed if the state can prove that 
it has taken the measures with a view to ensuring the stability of the system, and the totality 
of the rights protected under the relevant instrument enshrining the socio-economic rights 
guarantees.141 This is the case under the European Charter of Social Rights (see Chapter III.) 
This point is linked to the point on emergency and crisis obligations and whether the 
exceptional nature of the crisis may alter the obligations owed to different parties. 
The reconciliation of human rights protection and the public interest in times of crisis sits 
uncomfortably with how rights are regarded in general. As McHarg has noted;  “it is central 
to our understanding of rights - especially judicially-protected human rights - that in 
situations of conflict they protect individuals' interests or choices from being overridden by 
considerations of collective utility.142 
Had the above cases been decided differently, it would not necessarily have represented an 
extension in the application of A1P1. The ECtHR may have held, as it did in N.K.M. and 
R.Sz, that the government’s reasons for implementing such a measure were deficient and 
could have been achieved by alternative measures less injurious to the applicant, or 
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Human Rights Law Review 35 <http://hrlr.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/hrlr/ngm042> accessed 17 July 
2015. See also Margot E Salomon, ‘Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions’ (2015) 4 Human 
Rights and International Institutions (November 29, 2014). European Law Journal 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2550773> accessed 1 June 2015.  
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disproportionate to the ends sought. In other words, the social Euro-crisis cases could have 
seen the ECtHR keeping to its usual test of legality, legitimacy and proportionality, while 
stating that the margin of appreciation afforded to states in times of crisis, though broader 
than usual, is not infinite. Citing grave financial problems as a reason for sweeping 
adjustments to pay, pensions and benefits may be deemed an acceptable goal, but ought not 
to escape scrutiny entirely. 
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Chapter II: The ECtHR on financial stability, emergency and crisis. 
 
While the previous section considered some of the more apparent points which emerged from 
a textual reading of the social Euro-crisis cases, the second section of the thesis pans back 
and engages with two larger themes connecting these cases with previous strands of 
Strasbourg’s jurisprudence. This chapter provides context for the European sovereign debt 
crisis by examining Strasbourg’s approach to previous crises related temporally and 
thematically.  
I consider the role of financial institutions and financial stability (as well as the consequences 
of financial instability), the perception that a state of emergency exists and the prevalence of 
‘exceptional circumstances’. The former is linked temporally to the social Euro-crisis cases 
(as the European sovereign debt crisis was preceded by, and to some extent triggered, by a 
global financial crisis), while the latter shares a thematic link with the cases in Chapter I, as 
an ubiquitous feature of the social Euro-crisis cases was the atmosphere of crisis and 
emergency. Examining some of the ECtHR jurisprudence that has emerged from the crisis, 
these lines of case law cast an interesting light on how Strasbourg reacts to the protection of 
social rights in crisis situations. 
 
1. The ECtHR on financial stability and international financial institutions. 
I do not assert that a direct link exists between this set of cases and my core social Euro-crisis 
cases, merely that it is possible to infer interesting insights into the viewpoint of the Court 
where there is interplay of financial institutions, financial or economic instability and social 
rights. 
Strasbourg placed great emphasis on the gravity of the financial difficulties faced by the 
respondent states in the social Euro-crisis cases. In the context of the crises, the socio-
economic rights jurisprudence of Strasbourg is necessarily enmeshed within the larger 
context of the global financial crisis, which preceded and to an extent precipitated the 
European sovereign debt crisis. I do not aim to assert that a direct link exists between this set 
of cases and my core social Euro crisis cases, merely that it is possible to infer interesting 
insights into the viewpoint of the Court where there is interplay of financial institutions, 
financial or economic instability and social rights. 
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At the Koufaki and Da Conceição Mateus end of the spectrum discussed in Chapter I, the 
overt references by the Court to the Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the 
national governments and the consortium of international lenders presents a frank view of the 
Court’s weighing of the gravity of financial interests. I think it germane to examine these 
cases below as a contrast to the crisis at issue in the social Euro-crisis cases above. The 
example of the financial cases serves a dual purpose; to shed light on the view Strasbourg has 
taken in previous instances of economic and financial instability, and to examine how the 
Court regards the balance that ought to be struck between protected Convention rights and the 
state’s prerogative to take measures to both avert crisis and to address existing crises with 
expediency. 
In this section, I examine a case involving nationalisation of banks and depositor protection 
in the financial crisis of 2008 (Dennis Grainger and others v. UK143), a case concerned with 
the applicant’s inability to recover “old” foreign-currency savings deposited with two banks 
in what is now Bosnia and Herzegovina following the dissolution of the former Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) (Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina144), 
and a case involving an IMF loan and the compulsory liquidation of a bank following the 
withdrawal of a banking licence (Capital Bank AD v Bulgaria).145 All are A1P1 cases, while 
Ališić involved a violation of Article 13 and Capital Bank AD involved violations of both 
Article 6(1) and Article 13. Grainger is closely temporally related to the social Euro-crisis 
cases, while Ališić and Capital Bank AD are thematically linked. 
The margin of appreciation afforded to states in times of “fundamental changes to a country’s 
system”146 is extensive. Monetary and fiscal stability reside within the inner sanctum of 
national prerogatives, into which Strasbourg rarely treads. The circumstances in which the 
Court would defer to the national authorities would include “the transition from a totalitarian 
regime to a democratic form of government, the reform of the State's political, legal and 
economic structure and indeed the dissolution of the State followed by a brutal war, 
phenomena which often involve the enactment of large-scale economic and social 
legislation.”147 It must also be emphasised that the prevailing consensus in the literature on 
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international financial institutions does not present any clear confirmation that bodies like the 
IMF or the World Bank can be said to possess positive human rights obligations.148  
1.1 Dennis Grainger and others v. UK.  
The ECtHR, following the approach of the U.K. courts, allowed the executive a broad margin 
of appreciation in determining how shareholders were to be compensated after the collapse 
and subsequent nationalisation of the Northern Rock bank.  
The fact that the nationalisation of the bank was in accordance with law was not contested; 
the applicants, many of whom had lost their savings and pensions when the bank collapsed, 
argued that the Valuer appointed should have been permitted to exercise his best judgement 
as to the compensation scheme, which would have struck a fair balance.  
With regard to the legitimacy of the measure, particular reference was made by the ECtHR to 
the efforts of the U.K. Government to maintain stability in the face of the unfolding financial 
crisis: 
“The Court of Appeal took the view that the Government should be afforded a wide margin 
of appreciation in this case, since the impugned action arose in the context of macro-
economic policy. The Court agrees that given the exceptional circumstances prevailing  in the 
financial sector, both domestically  and  internationally,  at  the  relevant  time,  a  wide  
margin  of appreciation  is  appropriate.”149 
The dangers of ‘moral hazard’ (the  risk that financial institutions would take on greater 
liquidity risks based on an assumption that the Bank of England would provide assistance in 
the event of a crisis150) was also highlighted by the Court: “the Court has stressed  on  many  
occasions  that  this  provision  [Article 1 of Protocol No. 1] cannot  be  interpreted  as 
imposing any general obligation on  the Contracting States to cover the debts of private 
entities”.151   
This reasoning led the ECtHR to conclude that the measure was legitimate. (It ought not to be 
forgotten that moral hazard has played a significant role in the reasoning behind the 
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imposition of “strict conditionality” in instruments enacted for the management of sovereign 
debt crises.152)  
This leaves the issue of whether opting to grant no compensation to the shareholders of 
Northern Rock amounted to a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s right to 
property. It was held that “the taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably 
related to its value will normally constitute a disproportionate interference and a total lack of 
compensation can be considered justifiable under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in 
exceptional circumstances”.153 As no viable alternative presented itself, the ECtHR 
considered the Compensation Scheme merely one of the steps in series of support measures, 
concluding with the nationalisation of Northern Rock.154 
 
The Grainger case introduces several issues pertinent to the analysis. That I include it as a 
case concerning social rights in the financial crisis is due to its similarities with the social 
Euro-crisis cases: firstly, the margin of appreciation granted to the executive was very broad 
indeed, even at the expense of those who lost their entire savings as a result of the decision 
not to reimburse the shareholders.155 This provides an interesting parallel to the social Euro-
crisis cases and the sovereign debt crisis: the U.K. not being a Eurozone state, the wider 
European financial structure was not directly at risk (it was an internal matter, insofar as no 
international creditors or lending institutions were involved.) The ECtHR nevertheless 
refused to consider trespassing into national prerogative territory. 
 
1.2 Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
 
Grainger can be contrasted with another case which involved the repayment of shareholders 
after a banking collapse: Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Ališić mainly 
concerned the role of the principle of territoriality in situations of State succession, 
particularly with regard to frozen bank accounts. However, the point which is considered here 
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is the applicants’ inability to recover “old” foreign-currency savings – deposited with two 
banks in what is now Bosnia and Herzegovina – following the dissolution of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).156 In this case, the Grand Chamber first 
agreed with the Chamber’s finding that Ljubljanska Banka Ljubljana and Investbanka had 
remained liable for the “old” foreign-currency savings in all their branches until the 
dissolution of the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and that they had 
remained liable for these deposits in their Bosnian Herzegovinian branches since the 
dissolution of the SFRY. The Grand Chamber therefore confirmed that there had been 
sufficient grounds to deem Slovenia and Serbia respectively responsible for Ljubljanska 
Banka Ljubljana’s debt to Ms Ališić and Mr Sadžak and for Investbanka’s debt to Mr 
Šahdanović. Indeed, the Governments had disposed of these banks’ assets as they had seen 
fit. Having considered the Grainger case above, it is important to note that the ECtHR stated 
that these conclusions were limited to the circumstances of the Ališić and Others case.157  
The Court did not imply that no State would ever be able to rehabilitate a failed bank without 
incurring direct responsibility under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for the bank’s debt. Nor did 
that provision require that foreign branches of domestic banks always be included in 
domestic deposit-guarantee schemes. 158 The Court indeed considered the present case to be 
exceptional, as the branches in question were not foreign branches when the applicants had 
deposited their money, and because it was different from a standard case of rehabilitation of 
an insolvent private bank (the banks in question had always been either State- or socially-
owned).159 This is interesting to consider in light of the large number of banks throughout 
Europe that have been partially or even fully nationalised during the financial and sovereign 
debt crises160, as well as the Grainger case above. 
Whereas some delays might be justified in exceptional circumstances, the applicants had 
been kept waiting too long and, notwithstanding governments’ room for manoeuvre in social 
and economic policy making, Slovenia and Serbia had not struck a fair balance between the 
general interest of the community and the property rights of the applicants, who had borne a 
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disproportionate burden.161 There had therefore been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1 by Slovenia in respect of Ms Ališić and Mr Sadžak and a violation of that provision by 
Serbia in respect of Mr Šahdanović.162  
1.3 Capital Bank AD v Bulgaria. 
This case provides an example of the engagement of the ECtHR with international financial 
institutions, in this case the IMF. The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 
6(1) and Article 1 of Protocol 1in a case which concerned the withdrawal of a banking 
licence, resulting in compulsory liquidation. The Court held that: “ [the]Government’s 
reliance on the alleged demands  by  the IMF to limit the courts’  involvement in the closing 
of ailing banks was misplaced, because Bulgaria  could  not  avoid  its  obligations  under  the  
Convention  under  the guise  of  complying with the  recommendations  of  an  international 
organisation”.163  
 
It is interesting to compare the approaches of the ECtHR to how agreements with 
international financial institutions – the IMF in this case – are to be balanced against the 
obligations of state parties under the Convention.  
The present crises are, of course, very different to the circumstances which placed the IMF in 
Bulgaria in the 1990s, but it is nonetheless relevant.  The Court noted in that case that the 
stability of the banking system was a “sensitive economic area”, and stated that a wide 
margin of appreciation was appropriate in the circumstances, but refuted the Government’s 
reference that the agreement Bulgaria concluded with the IMF, forbidding judicial review as 
part of a condition to establish a currency board in Bulgaria in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis in 1996-97, should absolve Bulgaria of its obligations under the Convention164. 
 
Time played an important role in the Court’s balancing analysis; it was acknowledged in the 
Capital Bank AD v Bulgaria case that certain circumstances could exist where “there may be 
a paramount need to act expeditiously and without advance notice in order to avoid 
irreparable harm to the bank, its depositors and other creditors, or the banking and financial 
system as a whole.”165 The Court was of the opinion that this was not such a case where 
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“time was of the essence.” Despite the fact that the revocation of the applicant bank’s licence 
took place  during  a banking crisis, “it does not appear that it was  a  matter  of  such  
urgency  that  any  delay  occasioned  by  some  sort  of formal  procedure  would  have  been  
unduly  prejudicial.”166 
A similar rhetoric was employed in Ališić, where the Court held that the delay the applicants 
had suffered in recovering their savings was not justified, even with the invocation by Serbia 
and Slovenia of the “territoriality principle”, and the argument put forward that the 
international law on State succession required only that settlements be negotiated in good 
faith, with no time-limits required.167 The ECtHR went so far as to say that it was rather the 
‘“equitable proportion” principle is the governing principle in so far as State debts are 
concerned.’168, disputing the reasons put forward by the respondent states. Such a principle 
could equally have been applied to the Grainger case, had the ECtHR not limited the finding 
in Ališić to its own facts. 
This view is material when reading the Euro-crisis cases; the fear of widespread and 
devastating contagion prompted many decisions that, in hindsight, were not beneficial and 
may even have worsened some of the adverse effects of the crisis.169 The questions of 
immediacy were not directly addressed by the ECtHR in the Euro-crisis cases discussed in 
the last chapter. 
The ECtHR found for the applicants in two of the above cases (partially in Ališić and in 
Capital Bank AD.) Even where the highly sensitive area of domestic financial regulation is a 
factor, Strasbourg still applies a rigorous standard of review to determine whether challenged 
measures can be justified. This highlights the central issue of the social Euro-crisis cases; the 
highly deferential approach to executive decision-making diminishes the standard of review 
conducted by the Court.  
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2. The Rhetoric of Exceptionality: the ECtHR on emergency and crisis. 
 
The second strand branching off from the core narrative is the discussion of the ECtHR’s 
approach to emergency and crisis, and how this has manifested itself in the social Euro-crisis 
cases.  
It must first be stated that I do not maintain that the European sovereign debt crisis is an 
undeclared emergency. I merely point out that there is cause for concern in the choice of 
language used by the ECtHR, and that such language and reasoning, evident to varying 
degrees in all of the social Euro-crisis cases, runs the risk of entrenching an approach which 
may weaken the formula used by the Court and diminish the protection of rights under the 
Convention.   
In the ‘bailout’ cases examined in Chapter I, the Court invoked “exceptional circumstances” 
or some variant thereof (“exceptional crisis without precedent”170, “exceptional economic and 
financial crisis”171) when considering the arguments of the respondent governments. The 
concept of emergency is conspicuous by its absence. I believe these two concepts overlap in 
substance, even if Strasbourg has not explicitly connected them in its rulings. 
I examine below some theoretical contributions to the literature on economic emergency, and 
legal emergency in general.  
2.1 The Economic State of Emergency. 
 
In the corpus of literature on the rule of law, economic emergency is located at the logical 
intersection of two different strands of scholarship; one arising from the economic 
development context (economic development of the rule of law), and one responding to the 
political turmoil ensuing from twentieth century declarations of states of emergency 
(emergency rule of law).172 
Gross and Ní Aoláin submit that economic emergency has fallen in between these two 
approaches, with the economic development literature unconcerned with states of emergency 
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and the emergency rule of law literature largely neglecting the problems posed by economic 
emergencies.173 Heller comments on the work of scholars such as Paulsen and Gross, that the 
emphasis these authors place on the exceptionality of the situation requiring a derogation is 
not matched by a precise description of what exactly those situations might look like.174 This 
is precisely the issue considered below in the Jahn and Others v Germany case. 
The cases below occur against the backdrop of the massive rise in importance of global 
finance in national economies in recent decades, considered to some extent in the previous 
section. The prominent space that international banking and finance has carved for itself is 
evident in European economies and the interconnectedness of the Eurozone financial 
structure. The tone of the public discourse in the Eurozone has been one of emergency – the 
crisis summits and all-night parliamentary sittings foster an atmosphere of urgency. There is 
an interesting case to be made that the broadening of the margin of appreciation doctrine, 
demonstrating exponentially rising levels of deference towards executives where financial 
stability is concerned, represents the risk of an ‘undeclared emergency’ for fundamental 
rights.175  
I would add to this assessment that the nature of the claims in the social Euro crisis cases is 
compounded both by the untested nature of economic emergency within the ECHR 
framework176, and the nature of the claims themselves – they being largely socio-economic in 
nature and socio-economic claims being protected only obliquely by the Convention (see 
Chapter I.)  Strasbourg has never been asked to decide on an emergency case where the 
derogation from the Convention was the result of emergency economic circumstances. As 
Article 15 must first be invoked by the Contracting Party wishing to derogate, Strasbourg’s 
role in any emergency situation is necessarily reactive. This is discussed in the next section. 
I am influenced by the work of Giorgio Agamben and David Dyzenhaus in conceptualising 
whether the crisis represents, if not the abdication from the rule of law that an emergency 
                                                          
173 Ibid. 
174 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Rhetoric of Necessity (or, Sanford Levinson’s Pinteresque Conversation), The’ (2005) 40 
Ga. L. Rev. 779 <http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-
bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/geolr40&section=25> accessed 14 July 2015, p. 792. 
175 Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the Margin 
of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights’, Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Aug., 2001), pp. 625-649. 
176 There has never been a derogation from Article 15 of the Convention on the grounds of economic 
emergency. See Ragnhilder Helgadóttir, ‘Economic Crises and Emergency Powers in Europe’ (2012) 2 Harvard 
Business Law Review Online, p 134. For a full list of derogations by country, see 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=005&CV=0&NA=15&PO=999&CN=99
9&VL=1&CM=9&CL=ENG, accessed 03.05.2015. 
Aoife Nannery 
would entail, rather an acknowledgement that the crisis represents a departure from usual 
conditions. Agamben theorizes a ‘state of exception’ as: ‘the state of exception is neither 
internal nor external to the juridical order, and the problem of defining it concerns precisely a 
threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but 
rather blur with one another’.177   
Dyzenhaus’ concept of a ‘legal grey hole’ is illuminating when examining the social Euro-
crisis cases.178As opposed to a Schmittian legal black hole, where there is no legal review of 
governmental actions whatsoever, a legal grey hole occurs where formally judicial review is 
in place, but in reality the supervision is non-existent. Jan Peter Hoof has written on how 
Dyzenhaus’ theory might be transposed to the ECHR system, examining cases regarding 
derogation where terrorist threats represent a “public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation”. However, I examine below how the concept of emergency, notable by its absence, is 
implicitly invoked by the ECtHR in its ‘exceptional circumstances’ rhetoric and reasoning.   
2.2 Article 15 ECHR: Derogation in time of emergency179  
Article 15 ECHR is, in some respects, a curious connection to make with the social Euro-
crisis cases. Although, as I submitted in my analysis of the cases, and as I discuss below on 
what I consider the concept of ‘exceptional circumstances’, there is no definite link to the 
Convention’s own emergency provision. It may appear strange to link two aspects where 
neither the Contracting States nor the ECtHR have done so, but, as I shall explain, there are 
compelling reasons for questioning why the ECtHR evokes the spectre of emergency where 
formal invocation has not been raised.  
Firstly, none of the Contracting States have invoked Article 15 in the current crisis, and there 
are currently no extant derogations in effect.180 I therefore proceed on the premise that the 
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Convention has remained operative in its entirety for the duration of the global financial crisis 
and the European sovereign debt crisis.  
The ECtHR has elaborated on the requirements for a ‘public emergency threatening the life 
of the nation’:  “(1) it must be actual or imminent, (2) Its effects must involve the whole 
nation, (3) The continuance of the organised life of the community must be threatened. (4) 
The crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal measures or restrictions, 
permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public safety, health and order, are 
plainly inadequate.” 181 
Is it possible, then, to have an ‘undeclared emergency’, where Article 15 is implicitly in 
effect? The answer, according to the Court’s previous case law, would appear to be in the 
negative. Any High Contracting State wishing to derogate must follow the proper procedure 
under Article 15 – as the concept of the rule of law is a notion inherent in all of the Articles 
of the Convention, as one of the fundamental principles in a democratic society.182 
It is clear from the above that an impromptu derogation from the Convention is 
impermissible. The language used by the Court in the social Euro-crisis cases, however, bears 
more than a passing resemblance to the criteria outlined in The Greek case. It is submitted 
that the vocabulary of the ECtHR in these cases possesses disquieting parallels with previous 
cases; instances where violations of Convention rights may have occurred, but were 
considered proportionate due to the ‘exceptional circumstances’ prevailing in the state. My 
foremost example of this is the Jahn case. 
3. Exceptional Circumstances 
The concept of what constitutes ‘exceptional circumstances’ is an extremely elastic one 
(indeed, its ability to encompass a range of different scenarios is arguably its most useful 
trait), ranging from transitions from authoritarian states to liberal democracies183, to averting 
the meltdown of the global financial system, as can be seen in the social Euro crisis cases. It 
echoes the comments of those who claim that the margin of appreciation is a ‘standardless 
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doctrine’184, and orientates the protection according to what is convenient for the state, not for 
the protection of human rights. As such, there is no ‘test’ that I am aware of to determine 
when and how a particular set of circumstances might be deemed to be “exceptional.” 
Paraphrasing from the dissenting judgments in the Jahn case, considered below, I highlight 
the existence of, and resort to, this justification as a cause for concern; it is invoked in the 
gravest of circumstances and remains largely unelaborated. 
There are a number of intriguing aspects to considering the social Euro-crisis cases alongside 
some of the earlier transitional justice cases. The circumstances in these cases were obviously 
very different, with different factors and reasoning, but as I argue below, reading them 
together is an interesting exercise. The ECtHR has previously had cause to adjudicate on a 
wide range of transitional justice cases. I consider one example of this case law below – the 
political and institutional transition from a centrally-planned State economy to a market 
economy which took place in the former Communist regimes of Eastern Europe in the 
1990’s. If it is possible to draw parallels between the emergency-exceptional circumstances 
lines of case law with the social Euro-crisis cases, then there ought to be scope to extend this 
reasoning to cases involving pensions and transitions in the state’s economy to be applicable 
to the social Euro-crisis cases. The crisis has, after all, resulted in permanent and profound 
shifts in the economies of Europe. This is most evident in the copious amounts of legislation 
enacted in the Eurozone Member States to combat the crisis and achieve budgetary 
stability.185   
3.1  Jahn and Others v Germany. 
The case of Jahn and Others v. Germany provides an insight into how the ECtHR regards the 
economic difficulties encountered by states in transition, as well as providing guidance on the 
dangers of a broad and undefined concept of “exceptional circumstances”. 
The five applicants in the case inherited land that had been allocated to their ascendants, 
subject to certain restrictions on disposal, following the land reform implemented in the 
Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany in 1945. In March 1990 the so-called Modrow Law came 
into force in the German Democratic Republic, lifting the restrictions on the disposal of land 
that had been hitherto applicable, whereupon those in possession of the land acquired full title 
to it. After German reunification some heirs (including the applicants) of persons who had 
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acquired land under the land reform were compelled to reassign their property to the tax 
authorities of their respective Land without compensation in accordance with the second 
Property Rights Amendment Act passed in July 1992 by the German federal parliament. 
Heirs of owners of land acquired under the land reform had to reassign it to the tax authorities 
if, on 15 March 1990, they were not carrying on an activity in the agriculture, forestry or 
food-industry sectors in the GDR, had not been carrying on an activity in one of those sectors 
during the previous ten years or were not members of an agricultural cooperative in the 
GDR.186  
The Jahn case is useful when considering the ECtHR’s approach to the Eurozone crisis. 
Whereas the Chamber in its decision of 22 January 2004 unanimously found a violation of 
A1P1 of the Convention, the Grand Chamber decided by eleven votes to six that there had 
been no breach of the right to property. The Court indicated that the historical context in 
which the crisis develops is significant, and that not all crises may be amenable to the same 
solutions: “The  Court, finding it natural that  the margin of appreciation available to the 
legislature  in  implementing  social  and  economic  policies  should  be  a  wide  one,  will 
respect the legislature's judgment as to what is “in the public interest” unless that judgment is 
manifestly without reasonable  foundation. The same applies necessarily, if not a fortiori, to 
such radical changes as those occurring at the time of German reunification, when the 
system changed to a market economy”187 (emphasis added.) 
The Grand Chamber held, reversing the decision of the Chamber, that there had been no 
violation of Article 1 of Protcol 1, finding that the aim pursued by the German Government 
was a legitimate one, within the state’s margin of appreciation, and that a disproportionate 
burden was not placed on the applicants. 188 
In dissenting opinion of Judges Costa and Borrego Borrego reference is made, as through the 
entire case, to the Modrow Law having been passed in an “undemocratically elected” 
parliament in the GDR – to detract from its legitimacy:  
“...the Modrow Law is stigmatised as having been “passed by a parliament that was not 
democratically elected”....it  should  be appreciated that  this  Law  was  enacted  “as  part  of  
the  negotiations”  between  the  two German States (and the four former occupying powers) 
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and that its aim was “to ensure a transition from a socialist economy to a market 
economy”....One could add that  the  legislative  departments  of  the  federal ministries  were  
involved  in drafting  it.  The Modrow Law  is  indeed  the  result of  political  
negotiation....The  “non-democratic  parliament”  of  the  former  GDR  is  therefore  not  the 
sole father of the Modrow Law”189(emphasis added). 
This dissenting judgment, one of four dissenting judgments from a total of six judges of the 
Grand Chamber, touches upon many issues which are pertinent to an analysis of the role of 
the ECtHR, in choosing its stance in times of transition and crisis. 
More specifically, however, the italicised part of the judgment above reflects striking 
parallels with the role of the troika in the present crisis. The plethora of emergency 
legislation, regulation and decrees has risen exponentially in the years of the crisis, often 
without the customary levels of parliamentary scrutiny and approval.190 The dissenting 
judgment is particularly scathing of the argumentation of the German Government; as the law 
which granted the applicants their land was passed by a parliament not democratically 
elected, certain rights within were to be nullified.  
Such an argument would have been entirely appropriate in Koufaki, where severe cuts in 
wages were imposed permanently and retroactively, following discussions between the 
executive and a trio of international lenders. The technocratic nature of the European 
sovereign debt crisis governance has been highlighted as posing a risk to democracy191 – in 
such cases the role of an international human rights court assumes an even greater importance 
as an external control.  
The dissenting judgment of Judge Ress is particularly critical and wary of developing a 
general concept of “exceptional circumstances”, the contours of which could be dangerously 
indistinct: “If the Court accepts that exceptional circumstances may justify interferences by 
the State with the individual's rights, this is a State-orientated concept that is a far cry from 
the concept of human rights protection.”192 This was mentioned in the introduction to the 
thesis, and is an argument which underpins much of my analysis of the social Euro-crisis 
cases. 
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The partly-dissenting judgment of Judge Cabral Barreto echoes this sentiment: “It is the 
settled case-law of the Court, however, that the taking of property without any compensation 
will result in a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 “except in exceptional circumstances.” 
I  find  it  very  difficult  to  speculate  generally  about   the  type  of “exceptional 
circumstances” that may justify a total lack of compensation.” Citing the case of The former 
King of Greece and Others v. Greece193, Judge Cabral Barreto recalled that the Court on that 
occasion had held, in what he considered a very similar set of exceptional circumstances (the 
transition from a monarchy to a republic) to those at issue, that “the lack of any compensation 
for the deprivation of the applicants' property upset, to the detriment of the applicants, the fair  
balance between the protection of property and the requirements of the public interest”. I can 
only transpose that reasoning and conclude, as in that judgment, that there has therefore been 
a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.” 
The prospects for any applicant who might seek to bring a case before the ECtHR in times of 
crisis or instability would appear to be dim. The breadth and potency of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine which Strasbourg invokes in these instances has proved an effective 
rebuff to all who seek to protect and maintain their property in times of uncertainty and 
instability.  
4. Ramifications: a different ECtHR? 
In the introduction, I submitted that the European Court of Human Rights did not effectively 
engage with the claims brought by the applicants against the measures which affected their 
right to property during the European sovereign debt crisis. The level of deference shown to 
the respondent governments as they adopted measures to tackle the economic crisis is the 
preeminent feature of the social Euro-crisis cases. This chapter considered analogous 
circumstances where a more robust stance had been adopted by the ECtHR, even as part of 
dissenting judgments, in order to illustrate that a more exacting standard had been adopted by 
Strasbourg on previous occasions. 
In his analysis of Jahn, Lebeck maintains that such deference could be warranted in certain 
respects by the fact that the situations were exceptional. 194 I am in agreement with him when 
he states that what is most concerning is not that there is a separate approach for issues of 
transitional justice per se, but that there appears to be no sophistication of the standard test 
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applied by Strasbourg in these instances; there is no stricter test of proportionality or a higher 
level of scrutiny of the methods used to achieve the stated and accepted public purposes.195 
As Lebeck presciently notes, “while it is certain that the unification of Germany was a unique 
event, it seems sensible to assume that large-scale legal changes will also occur in the future, 
and that they will give rise to human rights claims”.196 This is true with regard to the 
European crisis; the swathe of changes has been felt at both national and supranational level, 
encompassing all instruments and changes from constitutions and treaties downwards.197  
I find this argument compelling with regard to the social Euro-crisis cases, and the 
engagement of the ECtHR with the financial and sovereign debt crises more generally. As I 
have argued above, in certain respects the social Euro-crisis cases be regarded as analogous 
to cases involving issues of transitional justice – the overhaul in the fiscal management of the 
Greece, as an example, has resulted in fundamental and permanent systemic changes which 
has discommoded a great many citizens whose daily life in 2015 is no doubt radically 
different to before the onset of the crisis. 
However, what I am concerned with in this piece, and in considering this jurisprudence, is 
how the language and structures of the transitional justice cases are invoked implicitly. Using 
the same rhetoric of “exceptional circumstances”, and allowing for a very wide margin of 
appreciation with regard to fundamental rights protection, the social Euro-crisis cases 
demonstrate a muted acknowledgement of the precariousness of the situations in the 
responding states, allowing for fundamental rights infringements without explicitly saying as 
such.  
The analysis of the Euro-crisis cases and the exceptional circumstances cases, together with 
the consideration of financial institutions, would appear to paint rather a bleak picture for the 
protection of socio-economic rights in the ECtHR system. It is, of course, a small sample of 
cases; a thorough examination of the litigation taken against austerity measures as a result of 
the crisis lies beyond the scope of this project. Yet the very similarities of the fact patterns of 
the social Euro-crisis cases, and the reasoning used perhaps demonstrated the best chance for 
the Strasbourg Court to develop a coherent approach on how exactly the twin crises may 
impact upon protected interests under the Convention. As has been noted, the common 
denominator of the ECtHR’s approach would appear to be a greater than usual deferential 
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stance towards the governments of contracting states. The greater levels of state discretion in 
times of crisis may enable violations to pass without judicial scrutiny198, suggesting that there 
is no definitive ‘crisis approach’ in the ECtHR. Their reasoning in certain instances may 
signal a retrenchment in the protection of socio-economic rights. 
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Chapter III: The European Committee of Social Rights in the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
 
1. The European Social Charter and the European Committee of Social Rights. 
This chapter considers the contribution of the European Social Charter system to social rights 
protection in the European sovereign debt crisis. The European Social Rights Committee 
(ECSR) and the ECtHR are two distinct systems governed by separate – but complementary – 
instruments. As a major theme of human rights enforcement in Europe is the so-called 
indivisibility between civil and political and social, economic and cultural rights, the 
prospects for a harmonised interpretation of socio-economic rights protection between the 
ECHR and ESC systems is something to be considered.  The responses of both bodies to the 
crisis are examined, with a view to determining how socio-economic rights are upheld and 
defended in times of economic instability.  
The ECSR system is comprised of both a monitoring procedure – which is mandatory for all 
states which have ratified the Charter to submit to, and a Collective Complaints Procedure, 
for which the additional ratification of the 1995 Collective Complaints Protocol is 
required.199 In order to give full consideration to the ECSR’s decisions on the European 
sovereign debt crisis, the reporting system will be briefly examined to inform the analysis of 
the Collective Complaints. As of September 2015, the number of ratifications of the 1961 
Charter stood at forty-three, and signatories to the 1995 Collective Complaints Additional 
Protocol at fifteen.200 The Charter allows Contracting Parties discretion as to the rights by 
which they will be bound, and states are required to accept at least five out of seven so-called 
“core” articles and another ten articles, or forty-five numbered paragraphs (Article 20). In the 
Revised Social Charter, States have to accept at least six out of the nine core articles and a 
number of other rights or paragraphs provided that the total number is at least 16articles or 
63numbered paragraphs (Part III).201 
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The ECSR comprises of 15 independent, impartial experts, who are elected by the Committee 
of Ministers for a six year term. State reporting on the accepted core articles takes place every 
two years and every four years for non-core articles.202 
I consider two sets of Collective Complaints that have come before the ECSR as a result of 
the crisis. All seven Complaints are from Greek trade unions (it is fortunate that Greece, as 
the Eurozone state where the economic crisis has been most acutely felt, has ratified the 
Collective Complaints procedure.) All of the complaints directly concern measures taken by 
the Greek government to fulfil commitments made in the Memoranda of Understanding with 
Greece’s international creditors to address that country’s sovereign debt crisis.  
The first two Complaints, No. 65/2011 and No. 66/2011, concern provisions relating to 
reforms undertaken in Greek labour law and collective bargaining agreements. The second 
set, Complaints No. 76/2012, 77/2012, 78/2012, 79/2012 and 80/2012, concern measures 
relating to the reform and consolidation of Greece’s pension system. 
This set of complaints establishes the clearest link between the legal provisions and 
instruments aimed at tackling the economic crisis and the Committee’s scrutiny of the impact 
such provisions exert upon social rights under the Charter.  The claims concern two of the 
most pressing issues of the crisis – labour reform and fiscal consolidation in national social 
security systems – which have been responsible for much of the uncertainty, deprivation and 
poverty resulting from the European sovereign debt crisis.  
As to the question of whether the ECSR can properly be considered a judicial body for the 
purposes of this analysis, the literature takes a mixed view. Alston refers to the reporting 
system of the ECSR as ‘careful, professional and legally sound.’203 (He does, however, 
continue: ‘it is not seen to add enough value to the bargaining power of the relevant groups 
within the domestic political arena as to warrant a significant investment of time and 
resources.’) As has been mentioned, the huge increase of complaints before the Committee 
since the onset of the crisis may change this viewpoint.  
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Alston also notes that the ECSR does behave judicially to the extent that it considers both 
sides of the question when examining compliance, confines itself to applying the applicable 
legal norms to the facts before it, and formulates its reasoned views in a judicious fashion.204 
Cullen notes the division of competences within the system, with the ECSR having the 
exclusive competence to make legal interpretations of the ESC, including whether or not a 
state is in conformity with any particular provision, and the Committee of Ministers makes 
political determinations, based on economic and social factors in the state party.205 
Novitz regards the use of non-judicial language (like using non compliance instead of 
violation) as evidence of the lesser status accorded to socio-economic rights. Churchill and 
Khaliq also cite Soudre, who regards the programmatic nature of the rights as the reason for 
this. 
This consideration of the structural features of the ESC system is valuable when considering 
the Collective Complaints. 
1.1 The monitoring procedure 
The main supervisory mechanism of the ESC is a multi-stage State reporting system that is 
operated by the ECSR. On the basis of the reports, the ECSR determines compliance or non-
compliance with ESC provisions and adopts Conclusions accordingly.   
The Governmental Committee, which is composed of representatives of the contracting 
states, considers ECSR Conclusions of non-compliance. The State in question must indicate 
what measures it will take to address the finding of non-compliance. In the event that the 
Governmental Committee considers that the State is unlikely to take action on a decision of 
non-compliance, it may propose that the Committee of Ministers issue a Recommendation to 
the State concerned to take appropriate measures to remedy the situation. 
The process is then finalized by the Committee of Ministers, which is the COE’s decision-
making body comprised of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of all COE Member States. The 
Committee of Ministers decides whether to adopt a resolution closing the supervision cycle 
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or, by two thirds majority, to issue a non-binding Recommendation, requesting the State to 
bring national practice into conformity with the Charter.206 
1.2 The Collective Complaints Mechanism 
The Explanatory Report on the Protocol describes how the Collective Complaints Mechanism 
is intended to complement the State Reporting system and is “designed to increase the 
efficiency of the supervisory machinery.”207 
As there are currently only fifteen signatories to the Collective Complaints Procedure, this 
does hamper the reach of the Committee, as the most meritorious complaints may come from 
states which have not ratified the Additional Protocol. 
Although it has been dubbed the “poor little step sister” of the ECHR system208, the jump in 
the number of Collective Complaints registered since the outbreak of the crisis – many of 
which are challenges to austerity measures – may signal that the ESC is increasing in 
prominence. The number of Collective Complaints stood at fifty-four at the end of 2008, and 
has climbed to one hundred and eighteen at the time of writing (September 2015.) A doubling 
in the number of complaints lodged and decided since 2009 is undoubtedly a meteoric rise. 
Not only has the number of complaints decided by the Committee grown, but also the variety 
of issues which are being raised before the Committee has diversified.209 
Alston (writing in 2005, when the number of Complaints stood at twenty-five), maintained 
that the number of complaints may not have inspired confidence in and of itself, but that the 
stakes involved in some of the cases granted a better evaluation of its importance.210  
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1.3 Strengths and drawbacks of the Charter system 
The ECSR operates very permissive admissibility criteria for the Collective Complaints 
Procedure. Unlike the ECtHR, there is no requirement that a complaint must not be an abuse 
of the right of petition. An attempt by the Portuguese Government to invoke such a 
requirement in Complaint No. 11/2001 was unsuccessful. The Government’s argument that 
the complainant (the European Council of Police Trade Unions) was motivated by political 
considerations was rejected by the ECSR as being ‘invalid, not being one which may be 
relied on to establish the inadmissibility or ill-foundedness of a complaint.’211  
It has been suggested that as the claims before the Committee multiply, that such an 
exhaustive procedure may have to be trimmed in the interests of expediency.212 This has not 
yet been deemed necessary, as can be seen in the pension complaints below, where five 
complaints based on identical fact patterns were submitted by different Greek trade unions 
and accepted by the ECSR.  
The structure of the Charter and the requirements that states are obligated to undertake 
(choosing from a selection of provisions to be bound by, rather than the Charter in its 
entirety) makes for an imperfect quilt of protective guarantees. Khemani opines that “there is 
something problematically  oxymoronic in allowing a “pick and choose” system of 
rights which are simultaneously deemed “fundamental.”213  
 
1.3.1 The collective nature of the rights under the Charter 
 “If we define human rights as rights to which human beings are entitled, those rights can, by 
definition,never be ascribed to collectivities as such.”214 
Novitz questions whether there something inherent in social rights which means that they 
must be seen as ‘collective rights.’215 Quite apart from the nature of the problem that can be 
framed as a Collective Complaint, the collective aspect has implications for the remedies that 
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can be granted.216 Novitz acknowledges that the reasons for this choice of system may have 
been entirely pragmatic, and is sceptical that the mere exercise of tallying interests will 
impose a duty where none would otherwise arise.217 
The obvious difficulty is that the scale and breadth of the issue has to be significant enough to 
justify bringing a collective complaint. This makes it much easier to spot trends, but only 
after the circumstances responsible for the complaint have become so pervasive as to be felt 
by large numbers of individuals. In times of crisis, the widespread effects may enable those 
bringing a complaint to present the scope of the crisis much more convincingly. In Chapters I 
and II, I pointed out that singular incidents before the ECtHR, while capable of granting relief 
to individual claimants, are usually not generally applicable (unless the complaint is made 
under the pilot procedure.) An example of this is the applicant in Koufaki, whereas the cuts to 
the applicant’s salary was deemed not disproportionate as it had not threatened her 
subsistence, the aggregate impact of the measures challenged in CC76/2012 was 
characterised by the Committee as likely to result in "a large scale pauperisation of a 
significant segment of the population."218 The span of the crisis is far more apparent in the 
form of a collective complaint. Although, as Novitz notes, the anonymity of the collectivity 
also allows the ECSR to avoid problems affecting individuals.219 
 
1.3.2 Committee of Ministers 
The role of the Committee of Ministers, it has been said, “is a strong reminder both of the fact 
that governments remain extremely sensitive in relation to social rights and that the autonomy 
accorded to the European Court of Human Rights under the Protocol 11 reforms is a far cry 
from the continuing second-guessing role retained by governments under the ESC system.”220 
The procedure is also said to be ‘highly politicised’221 and the Janus-faced nature of the 
Committee’s activities means that it occupies a very delicate position. On the one hand it 
must encourage states to provide information in the reports so as to aid them in realising their 
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obligations, while simultaneously using that information to rule against them in a quasi-
judicial setting. It would not be correct to say that it is this reticence which has militated 
against states providing detailed information in the exchange with the Committee in 
compiling reports; the lacklustre participation of some states long predates the establishment 
of the Collective Complaints mechanism.222 It is for this reason that I do not consider any 
insufficient responses by the Committee attributable to a desire not to antagonise respondent 
governments. 
2. Relationship to the ECHR system 
It is often said that the European Social Charter is the counterpart of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the ECHR).The 
Council of Europe’s website refers to the former as the ‘natural complement’ to the latter.223 
While most commentators allude to the cross-pollination that has taken place between the 
two systems (more evident since the Collective Complaints Mechanism has provided a body 
of case law for the ECtHR to draw upon224), certain authors also allude to the ‘parallel norms’ 
between the two systems that exist– one must be read in light of the other when issues that 
can be considered common to both systems are invoked.225 
Cullen notes that the ECSR adopts a similar interpretative approach to that of the ECtHR by 
applying principles like legitimate aim, legality, proportionality and margin of 
appreciation.226  The practice of the ECSR in evaluating limitations on rights is similar to that 
of the ECtHR, in that the ECSR tends to be relatively deferential to state arguments in 
relation to the question of whether a limitation serves a legitimate aim, but often subsequently 
finds the limitation to be disproportionate.227 This is worth bearing in mind when the 
complaints are considered below.  
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The ECSR and the European Court of Human Rights render decisions which are usually 
consistent with each other’s jurisprudence.228 Malinverni maintains that the collective nature 
of Charter rights is a manifestation of the Committee’s mandate: “The Committee decides on 
the conformity with the Charter not of individual and concrete acts, but of laws, regulations, 
practices or situations...since the ECSR has been empowered to rule on Collective 
Complaints, it happens that both the Committee and the ECtHR have sometimes ruled on 
similar cases that raise similar issues. The only difference is that the Court considers them as 
part of individual applications, while the Committee examines them in a more global context, 
which concerns several persons. But the case law of the two bodies influences each other.”229      
The use of the margin of appreciation doctrine is a good example of borrowing between the 
bodies. The ECSR has decided in the complaints considered below that the balance between 
respect for state discretion and protection of ESC rights fell on the side of human rights 
protection. An example of this approach may be found in Complaint No. 30/2005, 
Marangopolous Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) v Greece, where, as noted, the ECSR 
decided that: ‘even taking into consideration the margin of discretion granted to national 
authorities in such matters, the Committee considers that Greece has not managed to strike a 
reasonable balance’ between ESC rights and general interests.230 In Complaint No. 
31/2005,European Roma Rights Centre v Bulgaria, the ECSR cited the ECHR decision of 
Ilascu v Moldova and Russia on the proper balance to be struck between the general interest 
and the interests of particular groups and therefore the extent of a state’s margin of 
appreciation: “Nonetheless, “when the achievement of one of the rights in question is 
exceptionally complex and particularly expensive to resolve, a State Party must take 
measures that allows it to achieve the objectives of the Charter within a reasonable time, with 
measurable progress and to an extent consistent with the maximum use of available 
resources” (Autism-Europe v. France, Complaint N° 13/2002, decision on the merits of 4 
November 2003, § 53).”231 
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Focusing on the challenge of regressive social security measures, Mola notes that the main 
causes of action under the Charter and the Convention, i.e. Art. 12 ESC and A1P1 ECHR, 
present both different (but partly overlapping) contents and similar limitations.232 
As has been discussed, however, this is by no means a partnership of equals, and the superior 
status of the Convention system in comparison to the Charter system is plain. Membership of 
the Council of Europe is conditional upon acceding to the ECHR and compliance with the 
decisions of the ECtHR, while the European Social Charter is not afforded a similar status. 
States enjoy a unique degree of flexibility in the obligations undertaken under the Charter, 
which allows them a measure of discretion as to the rights by which they will be bound. 
There is no similar flexibility under the ECHR, where under Article 1 states undertake a duty 
to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of 
this Convention”. 
The ECtHR, as the crown jewel of the Council of Europe, did not always enjoy its current 
standing. Although, as discussed, the Charter system is replete with restrictive features which 
can hamstring the efficacy of its judgments, it is not far-fetched to venture that the spike in 
complaints and the developing and diversifying of the ECSR’s reasoning will lead to the ESC 
system becoming more widely cited and considered. It may be the case that the increased 
exposure that the Greek Complaints – which concern very high-profile measures, receiving a 
great deal of media coverage and sparks debate at the highest levels of European politics – 
bring to the Committee may yet lend the “poor little step-sister” the authority to take up a 
more prominent and visible role in promoting and protecting socio-economic rights in 
Europe. 
 
3. The ECSR in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis: Conclusions and Complaints. 
The General Introductions to the ECSR Country Reports provide interpretative statements on 
the Charter. They also address the most pressing issues which the contracting states have 
been confronted with during the reporting cycle. The economic crisis in Europe, and the 
strain which it places upon social security systems, has featured in the General Conclusions 
of the ECSR. 
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In the General Introduction to Conclusions to XIX-2 (2009), the Committee included a 
comment on the application of the Charter in the context of the global economic crisis. The 
crisis came in the midst of a reporting cycle where, at the outset, governments were generally 
expanding their social security cover. The Committee did state that even in 2008 and 2009, 
the economic crisis already had had a significant impact on social rights. 
In this context, the Committee recalled that under the Charter the “Parties have accepted to 
pursue by all appropriate means, the attainment of conditions in which inter alia the right to 
health, the right to social security, the right to social and medical assistance and the right to 
benefit from social welfare services may be effectively realised. From this point of view, the 
Committee considers that the economic crisis should not have as a consequence the reduction 
of the protection of the rights recognized by the Charter.”233 This position is reaffirmed in the 
Collective Complaints. 
3.1 The Labour Complaints: Collective Complaints 65/2011 and 66/2011   
Alston is of the opinion that the Charter is not a very dynamic instrument, given what he 
refers to as the Committee’s ‘predilection’ for labour law experts.234 However true this 
statement is, labour rights lie at the core of the Charter, and the Committee has a developed 
jurisprudence to draw upon.  
3.1.1 Complaint No. 65/2011 General Federation of employees of the national 
electric power corporation (GENOP-DEI) / Confederation of Greek Civil 
Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v. Greece 
GENOP-DEI and ADEDY alleged that the situation in Greece is not in conformity with 
Article 4§4 of the 1961 Charter and Article 3§1a of the Additional Protocol of 1988. 
The Committee, after considering the impugned domestic legal provisions (discussed below), 
cited the views of the Greek National Commission for Human Rights on the Medium-Term 
Fiscal Strategy Framework concluded between Greece and its creditors. The Commission 
expressed alarm at the drastic lowering of salaries and pensions, even at the lower end of the 
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scale, as well as the weakening of collective bargaining instruments designed to protect 
minimum standards, in light of rising unemployment and overall job insecurity in Greece.235 
The Committee referred to the submissions made by the Greek Government in its Preliminary 
Remarks. The submissions focussed on the economic crisis, the measures implemented to 
address it and the desired results; a labour market that would be more flexible, a reduction in 
unemployment, an improvement in the system of collective bargaining agreements and the 
enhancement of the competitiveness of Greek enterprise.236   
The Committee reiterated its statement from its general introduction to Conclusions XIX-2 
(2009), where it concluded that “the economic crisis should not have as a consequence the 
reduction of the protection of the rights recognised by the Charter. Hence, the governments 
are bound to take all necessary steps to ensure that the rights of the Charter are effectively 
guaranteed at a period of time when beneficiaries need the protection most.”237 
The Committee is clear that while rising unemployment places added strain on social security 
systems and contribution revenues decline, the obligations that contracting parties assumed 
under the 1961 obliges them “to pursue by all appropriate means, the attainment of conditions 
in which inter alia the right to health, the right to social security, the right to social and 
medical assistance and the right to benefit from social welfare services may be effectively 
realised.”238 
When applied to the complaint, the Committee considered that attempts at greater labour 
flexibility with the aim of encouraging hiring and combating unemployment should not result 
in broad categories of employees being deprived of the protection of the labour law, which 
defends them both from economic fluctuations and arbitrary decision-making by their 
employers. It pointed out that this would force employees to shoulder a disproportionately 
large share of the consequences of the crisis (an echo of its statement that one of the 
underlying purposes of the social rights in the Charter is the promotion of solidarity.239) It 
also pointed out that such pro-cyclical policies would risk exacerbating the effects of the 
crisis by placing an increased strain on welfare systems, adding that this would inevitably be 
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the case unless it was decided to stop fulfilling Charter obligations in the areas of social 
protection.240 
Alleged violation of Article 4§4 of the 1961 Charter 
The  complainant  organisations  claimed  that  Section  17§5  of  Act  No.  3899 of 17 
December 2010 is incompatible with Article 4§4 of the 1961 Charter as it provides that 
during the one year probationary period, a permanent contract may be terminated without 
notice and with no severance pay.  In this connection, GENOP-DEI and ADEDY referred to 
the  principle laid  down  by  the  Committee  to  the  effect  that  “the  right  to  reasonable  
notice  of termination  of employment  applies  to  all  categories  of  employees  
(Conclusions  XIII -4, Belgium,  p.352)”  and  that  the  period  of  notice  “also  applies  
during  the  probationary period (Conclusions 2010, Ukraine)”.241 Further to this, the length 
of the probation period is linked, among other things, to the qualifications of the employees 
and as a result cannot be the same for all employees, or laid down in statute, as is the case for 
Section 17. The complainants submitted that this would be a breach of the proportionality 
principle, as espoused by the CJEU and the ECtHR.242  
As the impugned section concerned “probation employment contracts”, the respondent 
Government believed that the complainant organisations had confused “the scope of 
probation employment contracts and open-ended contracts of employment.” The Greek 
Government held that the emphasis was to be placed on the trial nature of the contract, 
allowing the employer to evaluate the employee before an open-ended contract of 
employment is offered.243 As for the reasonableness of the provision, the Greek government 
maintained that the economic crisis and the uncertain nature of Greek enterprises’ business 
activities justified such provisions. On the notice period required under Article 4§4 of the 
1961 Charter244, the respondent Government submitted that it was not applicable to 
probationary contracts.245  
Assessment of the Committee 
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The Committee had cause to restate several of its principles from previous rulings: the right 
to reasonable notice of termination of employment applies to all categories of employees, 
regardless of their grade or status; while the Committee had not set a definition for 
“reasonable” as a concept in abstracto, the major criterion was length of service; the main 
purpose of giving a reasonable notice is to permit the person a certain time to look for other 
work before his or her current employment ends and they are still receiving wages; that the 
only acceptable justification for immediate dismissal is serious misconduct.246  
While the qualifications required for the post occupied and the conduct of the employee may 
justify some variance in the length of the probationary period, the ECSR held that the concept 
could not be stretched to make the probationary period so long that guarantees on notice and 
severance pay are rendered ineffective.247 
The Committee held that Section 17§5 of Act No. 3899 of 17 December 2010 was a violation 
of Article 4§4 of the 1961 Charter, as it made no provision for notice periods or severance 
pay if the contract were to be terminated within one year, notwithstanding that under the 
same law, such contracts qualify as ‘permanent’.248  
Alleged violation of Article 3§1 of the 1988 Additional Protocol 
The Greek Government pointed out that although enterprise-level collective agreements are 
permitted to deviate from sectoral collective agreements, the enterprise-level agreements 
cannot include terms that are less favourable to those in the relevant national general 
collective agreements. In addition to this, the Government states that the introduction of the 
new bargaining level aims at greater decentralization of collective bargaining.249  
The Committee stated that it had taken into account the conclusions of the ILO Report on the 
High Level Mission to Greece (2011) on collective bargaining when examining the Parties’ 
submissions. The Committee held that Article 3 of the 1988 Additional Protocol and, in 
particular, paragraph 1a, it did not concern the right to collective bargaining.250 Such 
concerns would properly be addressed under Articles 5 and 6 of the Charter, but those 
provisions had not been accepted by Greece and so the Committee was precluded from 
examining them – a reminder that the à la carte approach to accepting certain Charter 
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provisions makes for an imperfect quilt of guarantees. The Committee does not elaborate on 
this finding, merely referencing the Report of the ILO High Level Mission to Greece.251 It is 
odd that such a fundamental difference of opinion of the Committee –evidenced by the 
dissenting opinion below – did not merit further discussion. 
The dissenting opinion of the Greek judge, Mr Petros Stangos, took a different position on 
this last point. Offering a differing textual interpretation of Article 3§1 of the 1988 Additional 
Protocol, Mr Stangos considered that a literal interpretation of the provision: that a collective 
agreement should, in all circumstances, allow the participation and contribution of the 
workers, or of their representatives, to determine and cumulatively improve their working 
conditions, organisation and environment. The Committee Member therefore considered that 
the impugned provisions (§5A.1 of Section 3 of Act No. 1876/90 introduced by Section 13 of 
Act No. 3899/2010) were incompatible with the Additional Protocol, as they grant trade 
unions in an undertaking the power to make the working conditions less favourable for the 
employees of the undertaking than those laid down in the sectoral agreements. Mr Stangos 
considered that this infringement was, in fact, corroborated by the Greek Government, as they 
had emphasised that remuneration paid to employees cannot be altered merely by switching 
from a sectoral collective agreement to an enterprise-level one252, while the stated primary 
purpose of the Act of 2010 is to reduce the cost of labour as a proportion of firms’ production 
costs, with a view to increasing competitiveness.253  
Mr. Stangos considered that the Greek legislation, granting trade unions in an undertaking the 
power to make the working conditions less favourable for the employees of the undertaking 
than those laid down in the sectoral agreements, outlawed participation and contribution by 
workers’ representatives where motivated by an aim (the impairment of working conditions) 
diametrically opposed to the one which is cited by the Government (improvement of these 
conditions.)   
 
 
                                                          
251 Ibid. 
252Ibid, § 10. 
253 ECSR, Complaint No. 65/2011, Decision on the Merits, (Dissenting Opinion of Mr Petros Stangos), pp. 12-
13. 
The ‘Conscience of Europe’ in the crisis 
 
71 
 
3.1.2 Complaint No. 66/2011: General Federation of employees of the national 
electric power corporation (GENOP-DEI) and Confederation of Greek Civil 
Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v. Greece 
  
GENOP-DEI and ADEDY challenged two provisions of Greek law Act No. 3863 of 15 
July 2010, which provided for special fixed-term “special apprenticeship contracts” to be 
concluded between employers and individuals aged 15 to 18, and allowed employers to 
pay new entrants to the labour market aged under 25 a rate of 84% of the minimum wage 
or daily wage, respectively.254  
The complainants alleged that the special apprenticeship contracts were not real 
employment contracts, since they did not form part of an integrated apprenticeship 
system. In support of this claim, the complainants referred to the lack of employer 
obligations under the contract and that the maximum duration of the special 
apprenticeship contracts (one year) was insufficient for it to be considered a genuine 
apprenticeship system.255 
It was also alleged that the apprenticeship contracts were merely contracts up to one year 
with no job security, and which deprived the young people concerned (with some 
exceptions, as in the areas of health and safety) of the benefits and protections provided 
by labour law, as well as excluding the apprentices from specific labour law safeguards 
which would otherwise apply and placed disproportionate restrictions on their entitlement 
to social security.256 
The Greek government refuted the allegations, stating that the “special apprenticeship 
contracts” were a means of integrating young people into the labour market, and thus 
aiding them in acquiring work experience. Given their length, the contracts could not be 
said to provide stable employment (this was acknowledged by the Greek government, 
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which nevertheless maintained that the apprenticeship contracts allowed for the 
preconditions of stable employment to be laid down.257) 
The ECSR began its observations by noting the Greek Government’s submissions on the 
economic crisis gripping Greece; a summary of the arguments put forward by the 
Government in their submission on the merits of the Complaint.258  The Greek 
Government highlighted that the measures were adopted in response to the economic 
crisis and formed part of an overall package of initiatives introduced to deal with the 
structural problems in the labour market and the operation of social security and welfare 
systems.259 The initiatives were aimed at addressing issues related to wage setting through 
collective bargaining and conflict resolution, introducing greater flexibility into 
employment relationship and, more generally, reducing the cost of  labour  and  
combating  unemployment,  especially youth  unemployment  which  had worsened as a 
result of the financial crisis.260 
The Greek government also pointed out that youth unemployment was continuing to grow 
because of young people’s lack of experience and skills, meaning employers are 
unwilling to hire them.261 
The ECSR referred to its remarks in the general introduction to Conclusions XIX-2 
(2009) (considered on p. 59.)The central place of labour rights to the Charter system is 
reiterated, in particular the provisions which protect employees from arbitrary decisions 
by employers or economic fluctuations. The Committee also stressed that any government 
attempts to stimulate greater employment should not deprive broad categories of 
employees of their labour law rights.262  
Alleged violation of Article 10§2 of the 1961 Charter 
The Committee then considered whether the regulations on the special apprenticeship 
contracts, restricting the duration of the contracts to a maximum of one year and making 
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no mention of employer obligations, constituted a violation of Article 10§2.263  
It pointed out that apart from the duration of the contract (maximum one year) and the 
remuneration (70%  of  the  minimum  wage  or  daily  wage  set  by  the  National 
General  Collective  Agreement),  Section  74§9  did  not  regulate  the  other  key aspects  
of  an  apprenticeship  relationship, chiefly the division of time between practical and 
theoretical learning, the manner in which apprentices are selected, the selection and 
qualifications of trainers, the remuneration of apprentices and termination of the 
apprenticeship contract. 264    
The impugned apprenticeship contracts did not include any of these requirements; merely 
stating that such contracts are to be concluded to enable the young people concerned to 
acquire vocational skills.265 The Committee rejected the Government’s argument that 
provisions made in Act No.  3475/2006 – which governed a separate framework of 
apprenticeship contracts – could ‘compensate’ for the deficiencies in the “special 
apprenticeship contracts”.266  
The above considered, the Committee held that there had been a violation of 10§2 of the 
Charter.267 The Committee further requested information from the Greek Government, 
which the Government had not deigned to offer to the Committee: the reasons given for 
the special conditions of social security applied to apprenticeship contracts, the necessity 
of these conditions as well as the results obtained by their implementation; the existence 
of measures of social assistance for those who find themselves in a situation of need as a 
result of the implementation of the above-mentioned conditions.268   
Turning to the context in which the Complaint arose, the Committee laid out how state 
parties to the Charter were to achieve a balance between the requirement in Article 12§3 
to “progressively realise” the effective exercise of the right to social security.269 While 
acknowledging that in times of economic crisis, the consolidation of public finances may 
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be required, the Committee stressed that any measures introduced to this end should not 
undermine the core framework of a national social security system, or deny individuals 
the opportunity to enjoy the protection it offers against serious social and economic risk. 
As such, the protection offered by the social security system must not become so 
insufficient so as to exclude whole categories of persons from its protection. 
The inadequacy of the justifications of the Greek Government, and the lack of 
information presented to explain the details of the contracts would appear to have been 
influential for the Committee’s conclusion that the special apprenticeship contracts were 
not in compliance with Article 10§2. This is reaffirmed in the pension complaints below, 
where the Committee demonstrates willingness to countenance measures which may 
result in complainants suffering materially, but are designed with the objective of 
systemic sustainability, if convincingly presented by the respondent government. When 
the respondent government does not provide adequate information for the Committee to 
deliberate upon, a finding of incompatibility is much more likely. 
Alleged violation of Article 4§1 taken in conjunction with Article 1§2 of the Charter 
The complainants alleged that to show that Section 74§8 was incompatible with the 
Charter, it was necessary to consider 4§1270 and 1§2271 in conjunction with one another.  
In considering the question of whether fair remuneration being paid under the “special 
apprenticeship contracts” was incompatible with the Charter, the Committee had regard to 
its Interpretative Statement of Article 4§1272, stating that in order to be considered fair, 
remuneration must be above the poverty line in a given country – 50% of the national 
average wage. The Committee went on to state that the wage must not, in principle, fall 
below 60% of the national average wage (once taxes are deducted – social security 
allowances or benefits are only considered if they have a direct link to the wage) unless 
the respondent government can demonstrate that such a wage is sufficient by providing 
detailed information on the cost of living.273 
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The Committee held that it is generally acceptable to pay a lower minimum wage to 
younger persons in certain circumstances once objective reasons are provided, and that 
taking part in an apprenticeship scheme or occupational training can come within this. 
The Committee was not opposed to the idea in principle that a reduction in wages may 
enable young people to access the labour market, and also pointed out that governments 
may rely on statistical evidence which demonstrates that young people may incur lower 
expenditure than other categories of workers.274 The Committee did state, however, that 
notwithstanding the above considerations, the reduction in the minimum wage for young 
workers must not fall below the poverty level of the country concerned.  
The Committee went on to express several reservations about the fluctuations in the 
Greek minimum wage. Referring to the 2011 ILO High Level Mission Report on Greece, 
the Committee noted that the take-home pay after tax is close to the poverty line for many 
workers, and also took note of the broader context of the changes in the minimum wage: 
“312.  On the basis of commitments taken in the Memoranda, sub-minimum wages have 
been introduced for young workers in order to boost youth employment (…)”.275  
The outcome of the Committee’s consideration of the data and the arguments presented 
by the parties was that the minimum wage for younger workers had fallen below the 
poverty level276 and concluded that the provisions of Section 74§8 of Act  3863/2010 and 
Section  1§1  of  Ministerial  Council  Act  No  6  of  28-2-2012 constituted a violation of 
Article 4§1 of the 1961 Charter.277 
While the Committee is prepared to accept the justifications of the respondent 
government, the reference to other sources to emphasise that the minimum threshold had 
been crossed may indicate a desire to reinforce its own findings. 
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3.2 The Pension Complaints: 76/2012, 77/2012, 78/2012, 79/2012, 80/2012. 
These five Collective Complaints were challenges to provisions enacted pursuant to the 
Memoranda of Understanding between Greece and its international creditors, and expressed 
in Council Decision Council Decision No. 2010/320/EU.278 The measures impugned 
consisted of structural adjustments to Greece’s social security system which involved, inter 
alia, a unified statutory retirement age, a reduction of the upper limit on pensions and a 
reduction of pension benefits for people entering retirement between the ages of 60–65 with a 
contributory period of less than 40 years.279  The measures are considered in detail in the 
Complaint.280 
The five complaints are based on the same facts281, and the complaints are largely identical. 
For this reason, only the first complaint will be analysed in detail. 
3.2.1 Federation of employed pensioners of Greece (IKA-ETAM) v. Greece 
Complaint No. 76/2012.  
The Committee considered the opinions expressed by different organisations and bodies on 
the crisis and the pension system in Greece in Complaint No. 76/2012. After the submissions 
of the complainant trade union and the respondent government, the Committee considered: 
the ETUC, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the International Labour 
Organisation, the Greek National Commission for Human Rights, as well as the European 
Court of Human Rights, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.   All of 
the additional opinions warned against the deterioration of the situation in Greece and the 
dangers posed by the crisis to the protection of rights in general and socio-economic rights in 
particular. Mola notes the distinction between the approaches of the ECSR and the ECtHR in 
this regard282; whereas the ECtHR hews quite closely to the national supreme courts in its 
consideration of the social Euro-crisis cases, the Committee draws from a more diverse array 
of sources. As the ECtHR has almost always deferred to executive prerogative in the crisis 
cases and the Committee has ruled against similar measures, it may be that the Committee 
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sought to bolster its finding by establishing that a consensus existed as to the impact of 
austerity measures on social rights throughout Europe. 
The Committee noted that the complainant trade union expressly invoked Article 12§3 of the 
1961 Charter, and the Committee added that the complaint can also be regarded as raising 
issues pertaining to Article 12§2.   
The invocation of Article 31§1 by the complainant trade union is an interesting point to 
note.283 This Article recognises that any restrictions or limitations to the rights guaranteed by 
the Charter must be prescribed by law.  The complainant aimed to directly challenge 
measures stipulated in the Memoranda of Understanding. On the basis of laws passed by the 
Greek parliament, the power to represent Greece in negotiations with the troika and to agree 
to the programme (the Memoranda) was delegated to the Minister for Finance. The 
Memoranda were then to be brought before the Greek parliament for discussion and 
information before being signed. The complainant trade union stated that this means that any 
texts adopted pursuant to this procedure would not be “fully-fledged laws” (this is never fully 
explained, as the Greek parliament did vote on the Memoranda,284 but the complainant did 
not go into greater detail, nor did the respondent government refute this claim.) In the 
decision on the merits, the Committee stated that Article 31§1 cannot be invoked as a stand-
alone provision, but rather acts as a reference for interpreting the substantive rights in the 
Charter which are at issue in a complaint.  The Committee had also decided on this point in 
its decision of the admissibility of the complaint, and stated that in substance, the complaint 
alleged a violation of Article 12. While this is a procedural issue, it is interesting to note that 
the legality of measures enacted pursuant to the Memoranda is being raised, and how these 
are framed by the complainants and handled by the Committee.  
In what might be interpreted as an oblique reference to the above point, the Committee 
emphasised that when state parties agree on binding measures which relate to matters within 
the remit of the Charter, they ought to take full account of their commitments under the 
Charter, and that it is for the Committee to assess compliance of a national situation with the 
Charter. This is the case even when the implementation of parallel international obligations 
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into domestic law may interfere with the proper implementation of those emanating from the 
Charter.285  
Addressing the government’s argument that the economic and social situation in Greece was 
the motivation for the adoption of the impugned measures, the Committee held that even 
where economic reasons make it impossible for a state to maintain their system of social 
security benefits at previous levels, Article 12§3 requires that the social security system must 
nevertheless maintained at a satisfactory level that takes into account the legitimate 
expectations of beneficiaries of the system and the right of all persons to effective enjoyment 
of the right to social security. This requirement to “raise progressively the system of social 
security to a higher level” (Article 12§3) is emphasised as being distinct from the requirement 
to maintain a satisfactory level of social security at least equal to that required for the 
ratification of the European Code of Social Security.286   
The Committee reiterated some of its previous statements on how states may restructure their 
social security systems and remain compliant with their obligations under the Charter: “In 
this context, the Committee has previously explicitly considered that restrictions or 
limitations to rights in the area of social security were compatible with the Charter in so far as 
they appeared necessary to ensure the maintenance of a given system of social security 
(General observation on Article 12§3; Conclusions XIII-4, p. 143) and did not prevent 
members of society from continuing to enjoy effective protection against social and economic 
risks. The Committee has also concluded that in view of the close relationship between the 
economy and social rights, the pursuit of economic goals is not incompatible with Article 12. 
It has considered that the contracting parties may consider that the consolidation of public 
finances, in order to avoid mounting deficits and debt interest, constitutes a means of 
safeguarding the social security system (Conclusions XIV-1, Austria). It has in particular 
considered that the adoption of measures aiming to ensure the financial viability of pension 
schemes, regard being had to demographic trends and the employment situation, may come 
within this field (Conclusions XIV-1, Belgium). It has likewise stated that new financing 
methods conducive to greater solidarity may be introduced within this context without this 
contravening the Charter (Conclusions XIV-1, France).”287 
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The Committee elaborated on the criteria to be taken into account when determining whether 
any restrictions to social security in view of economic and demographic factors are 
compatible with states parties’ obligations under the Charter. These would include the nature 
of the changes, the reasons given for their introduction and the extent of the changes, the aims 
being pursued, the availability of alternative means of social assistance for those who find 
themselves impacted by such changes and the results of those changes.288 The Committee’s 
application of these criteria to the impugned measures in these complaints is discussed in 
section 3.3, below.  
Reiterating its own position (from Complaint No. 65/2011, above), the Committee again 
noted that it had already been requested to express an opinion on the repercussions of the 
economic crisis on social rights. In basing its decision on the entirety of the above criteria, the 
Committee stated that not all of the reductions in pensions constituted a violation of the 1961 
Charter. These included certain holiday bonuses, restriction of pension rights where the level 
of pension benefits is sufficiently high, and cases where people not at an advanced age might 
be better off remaining in the workforce.289 
The Committee also recalled that it had previously upheld structural adjustments to social 
security systems where the aim of such measures was to reduce the national debt and improve 
the country’s economic foundations. It had also found measures adopted to take account of 
the aging of the population by reviewing funding structures to be compliant with the Charter. 
The Committee emphasised that in these cases: “although the overall standard of living of the 
population was affected by the reforms, care had been taken to ensure that the burden of these 
reforms did not weigh too heavily on the economically most vulnerable households”, and that 
alternative sources of income were made available to pensioners (Conclusions XIV-1, 
Finland).290 
However, the cumulative effect of the restrictions as cited by the complainant trade union (§ 
55-61) and not disputed by the respondent government could not but bring about a significant 
deterioration in living standards.  Even considering Greece’s particular situation and the 
necessity of urgent government action to tackle the crisis, the Committee considered the 
government to have conducted inadequate research and analysis into the effects of the 
measures and their impact upon vulnerable groups, or discussed available studies with the 
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organisations responsible for representing these groups. This, the Committee held, effectively 
meant that it had not been discovered whether other options could have been implemented 
which would have lessened the cumulative effects of the contested restrictions upon 
pensioners.291 
As such, the Committee held that the Government had not done enough to establish that 
efforts had been made to maintain a sufficient level of protection for the benefit of the most 
vulnerable. Although the language is not the same, the finding is one of the impugned 
measures being disproportionate to the ends sought.  Dissecting this decision presents several 
points for consideration. 
As De Becker has pointed out, the conclusion was somewhat vague. Apart from listing a 
series of general criteria that adjustments to social security systems would have to adhere to 
in order to remain compliant with Charter obligations (pp. 72-73, above), the Committee did 
not detail what exactly would have constituted ‘a sufficient level of protection’, or what 
efforts the Greek government might have made to exhaust all other avenues before the 
impugned measures were adopted.292 That the ‘cumulative effect of the restrictions...is bound 
to bring about a significant degradation in the standard of living...’, which served as the basis 
for Greece’s non-compliance, was not elaborated upon in the decision on the merits is 
perplexing. Nor was there developed guidance on this point in the Committee’s 2013 
Conclusions, published after the pension complaints had been handed down.293  
As for the inadequate level of research and analysis into the measures to establish whether 
less onerous alternatives could have been adopted, the Committee did not specify further 
what exactly a compliant position would resemble. De Becker speculates that as the 
Committee cited, in particular, the lack of coordination with the bodies responsible for 
representing those vulnerable groups which the impugned measures affected, this may be one 
example of the steps which the Greek Government ought to have taken. She believes these 
groups to be the social partners294 (the ECSR does not specify what exactly it means by the 
organisations concerned), as in its 2013 Conclusions, the Committee found that Lithuania had 
consulted the social partners, and Lithuania was held compliant, having conducted the 
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necessary level of research.295 While this is a plausible conclusion to come to, it is difficult to 
understand why the Committee itself did not state this. The Committee, in the conclusions for 
Greece in the country reports of 2013, confines itself to striking a more conciliatory tone, and 
restates the conclusions from all of the seven complaints considered. A full evaluation of the 
complaints will form part of the next reporting cycle.296 
The Committee concluded by stressing that, as the ECtHR had also held under the 
Convention, that decisions made in respect of pension entitlements must respect the need to 
reconcile the general interest with individual rights (an interesting inversion of the ECtHR 
cases examined in Chapter I, where the individual rights were required to be reconciled with 
the general interest.)The ECSR concluded that the legitimate expectations of pensioners were 
negatively impacted by the cumulative effects of the restrictions, but that other mechanisms, 
as well as domestic courts, are better suited to address this point from the perspective of the 
right to property.   
Some of the points from the documents submitted by the complainant trade union and the 
respondent government are worth considering in greater detail. 
In considering the ILO report on the High Level Mission to Greece of September 2011, the 
Committee quoted: “It [the Greek Government]...did not have the opportunity to discuss the 
impact that policies in the areas of taxation, wages and employment would have on the 
sustainability of the social security system. The Government was encouraged by the fact that 
these issues [the fact that data from ELSTAT showed that approximately 20% of the Greek 
population was facing the risk of poverty] were on the agenda of an international organisation 
and hoped that the ILO would be in a position to convey these issues to the Troika.”297  
This is a startling admission; while it may have been the case that the Greek Government 
indicated the support of the ILO in negotiations, it can equally be read as intimating that the 
Greek Government was asking for the ILO’s backing in liaising with the Troika. Explicitly 
enlisting an international human rights body’s support is a gesture which is obviously not lost 
on the Committee. This paragraph of the decision serves to illustrate its awareness of the role 
of the Troika in th negotiations, and the measures enacted pursuant to them. It would appear 
to be an express acknowledgement of the Committee’s awareness of the nature of the 
negotiations between Greece and its creditors. 
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The Committee goes on to state that the fact that the contested provisions of domestic law 
seek to fulfil the requirements of other legal obligations does not remove them from the ambit 
of the Charter.298 It had held as such on previous occasions where national provisions enacted 
by state parties to the Charter were intended to implement EU directives or other legal norms 
emanating from the EU.299 This point is underscored in the following paragraph, where the 
Committee emphasises that when state parties to the Charter agree on binding measures 
which come within the remit of the Charter, they should – both when preparing the text in 
question and when implementing it into national law – take into account the commitments 
they have taken upon ratifying the Charter.300 The above considered, the Committee held that 
despite the later international obligations of Greece, there was nothing to absolve the state 
party from fulfilling its obligations under the 1961 Charter.  
3.2.2 What points can be derived from the complaints? 
Taking the complaints in conjunction with the social Euro-crisis cases of the ECtHR, it is 
apparent that the ECSR places a lesser emphasis on the margin of appreciation doctrine. It 
would be incorrect to attribute this solely to a more deferential stance by the ECtHR and a 
more assertive one by the ECSR. I am inclined to believe that all of the factors considered at 
the beginning of this chapter played a role in the decisions of the Committee.  
It is not suggested, however, that the lesser status afforded to the margin of appreciation 
doctrine by the ECSR is necessarily an indication of a more assertive stance against austerity 
claims. As the protection of labour rights and social security rights are core objectives of the 
Charter and not part of an incremental expansion like Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the 
Convention, this may explain the assured stance of the Committee. 
Unlike the labour complaints, the pension complaints necessitated an evaluation of measures 
designed to reduce government expenditure, with a more technical analysis on the interaction 
between Charter rights and the allocation of resources undertaken by the Committee. It is 
clear that where such an intricate matter as the relationship between social security and cuts 
in government spending to achieve budgetary equilibrium would require very specific 
guidance as to how, exactly, such measures could remain compliant with Charter obligations. 
This is considered in the section below, where I examine how the Committee could have 
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addressed how the Greek Government’s reasoning on the necessity of the cuts to the pension 
system were intended to place the social security system on a more secure footing.  
De Becker highlights that the pension complaints represent the first time that the Committee 
has held that it is the cumulative effects of a series of impugned measures, rather than the 
impact of the measures singly, which consisted of the violation of the Charter, as well as 
noting that the Committee does not elaborate on exactly what exactly this might entail301: at 
what point exactly did the aggregation of factors tip Greece into non-compliance, and how 
are governments to avoid this in the future? 
I focus in the next section on a point which lies at the very core of the justification of the 
Greek Government for the impugned measures and which I believe the Committee failed to 
address. 
3.3 The ECSR in the crisis: tackling the crisis and achieving sustainability. 
In all of the complaints considered, the Committee acknowledged that fiscal consolidation 
and cutbacks in state expenditure are permitted, as are certain reforms in the regulation of the 
labour market where they are necessary to protect the totality of rights guaranteed under the 
Charter. What led the Committee to find the Greek Government non-compliant with its 
Charter obligations were the cumulative effects of the measures upon the affected groups, and 
the Greek Government’s failure to provide an adequate justification for those measures.302 
One particular argument from the Greek Government’s submissions on the complaints is the 
attempt to justify the impugned measures according to the stipulations of the Memoranda 
concluded with the troika. The respondent government repeatedly alluded to the central goals 
of the Memoranda (and by extension, all domestic legislation enacted to implement it) as the 
stabilisation of the Greek economy in the short term and the placing of the Greek finances on 
a sustainable footing in the longer term.303 According to the ECSR, states must differentiate 
between measures aimed at ‘dismantling social security schemes’ and arrangements that try 
to preserve the national social security system in order that it can resume its development 
when economic conditions permit.304  
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303 European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, ‘The Economic Adjustment 
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In Complaint 76/2012, the Greek Government maintained that the restructuring of the 
pension system is necessary both to achieve a sharp decrease in government spending, and to 
ensure that the base for the system in the future was secure. It was asserted by the Greek 
Government that these measures will actually be to the benefit of the whole. In its current 
manifestation, the system is deemed to be unsustainable and only a comprehensive overhaul 
of the system can ensure its survival. This line of argument is somewhat more persuasive in 
the pension complaints than it is in the labour complaints. In the labour complaints, as 
discussed above, the Committee criticised the Greek Government’s approach for failing to 
adequately specify how exactly the stated objectives of the measures – employment for 
young workers – would be encouraged and how the collective bargaining system would offer 
greater protection as a result. In the pension complaints, the Greek Government presents 
statistics indicating the rising ratio of pensioners to workers, along with predictions that 
current rates of benefits and payments into the future with an unprecedented number of 
pensioners will engulf more and more of public spending as a percentage of GDP (see section 
3, above.) The respondent government referenced the intergenerational debt burden and the 
principle of equal treatment.305 
The rationalisation and justification for the challenged measures by the Greek Government is 
contradictory: are long term systemic sustainability and short term fiscal equilibrium 
susceptible to the same types of measures as the ones challenged in this case? That is to say, 
can drastic cuts to pension entitlements be regarded as not only an emergency tool to restore 
liquidity, but also be suitable to place the pension system on a sustainable footing? The 
Committee does not address this point, which is strange, given that one of the reasons the 
Committee found the measures constituted a violation of the Charter was the inadequate level 
of analysis and research carried out by Greece.  
To address the first point: that the cuts were necessary to save the public finances from the 
brink of imminent collapse. This would appear to square with the ‘emergency and 
exceptionality’ reasoning explored in the ECtHR chapters. As Schlachter has noted, revised 
ESC, Article F (corresponding to Article 30(1) and (2) of the 1961 Charter) allows for 
derogations ‘in times of war or public emergency threatening the life of the nation’. This 
clause is based on Article 15 of the ECHR, so that inspiration as to its meaning may be drawn 
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from the case law of the ECtHR.306 The Committee never references emergency or resorts to 
the exceptionality logic prevalent in the ECtHR cases, despite the respondent government 
stressing that the measures were required by the exigencies of the crisis, so this argument is a 
conceptual one.  
 The sustainability rationalization is given more consideration in the complaint. The Greek 
Government states that the measures taken are necessary to ensure that a reasonable level of 
protection can be maintained into the future. Galazoulas and Tsetoura define sustainability in 
the context of the pension system as the capacity of a social security (pension) system to 
endure both from a social (protection) and an economic (financial balance) perspective.307 
The suggestion made in the complaints would appear to be that both goals might be amenable 
the same methods. Immediate, large-scale fiscal contraction is capable not only of 
temporarily restoring stability to the public finances, but is also the most effective tool to 
ensure long term systemic sustainability. This does not mesh with the understanding that to 
put a pension system on a sustainable footing (ensuring that asset allocation is efficient, while 
also ensuring that the pension as a protective social benefit is not undermined308) requires a 
careful and sophisticated blending of different factors. Some of which may require additional 
capital to update and modernise the system.309 
Some commentators maintain that the optimal approach is a combination of private and 
public sector involvement; the former provides the professional expertise to maximise 
efficiency, while the latter retains control to ensure that the underlying social purpose of the 
pension system is not undermined. As Galazoulas and Tsetoura state, the safety net between 
these two is law.310 
The particularities of the Greek pension system would appear to indicate that while a 
decrease in the level of public expenditure directed towards funding pensions is certainly 
necessary to restore equilibrium to the public finances in the short term, there are a number of 
outstanding structural issues which will not be solved merely by a reduction in spending. This 
approach reflects many of the measures set out in the Memoranda of Understanding, which 
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lean heavily towards cutting spending as the primary means of pension reform and far less on 
the overhaul and upgrade of the system (despite the claim in the Memorandum that 
“measures are structural in nature”311, the measures detailed appear to come largely from the 
demand side, as can be seen in the complaint.) 
Galazoulas and Tsetoura note that pension funds in Greece rarely involve professional 
investment consultants. They cite research which notes that non-professional staff, such as 
state officials or employee representatives are appointed to membership of funds’ Boards of 
Directors, without necessarily being familiar with the operation of money and capital 
markets, and that such a lack of expertise often leads to rather unsophisticated investment 
decisions.312 This would appear to indicate that the sustainability of the pension system is 
dependent not only on the demand-side factors (reducing expenditure), but also on the 
supply-side (ensuring that best practice is followed in the administration of the system to 
avert risk and minimise waste.) 
Given the particular details of the Greek pension system which were briefly discussed above, 
I conclude that it need not be assumed that these twin objectives are compatible or can be 
achieved simultaneously via a reduction in expenditure in the short term, when doing so may 
jeopardise the achievement of the longer term objective. It is a cause for concern that the 
ECSR, accustomed to giving structured guidance on technical areas of state expenditure on 
social security, should have overlooked such a fundamental distinction. This is not expanded 
upon in the 2012 or 2013 Committee reports on Greece, as the complaints considered here 
fall outside of those reporting cycles.  
Conclusion 
As was discussed in the introduction to the chapter, it is likely that the rising of the profile of 
the ESC system was given something of a “shot in the arm” by the exceptional situation that 
the crisis created in Europe, compounded by the responses of other judicial fora, which may 
have prompted prospective litigants to seek other avenues of redress.  
It is regrettable that despite a willingness to rule on controversial austerity measures, the 
ECSR should have left so many crucial points under-elaborated. If the crisis has presented 
new challenges and seen the ESC system rise in prominence, it is unfortunate that an 
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opportunity to provide guidance on protected social rights in times of economic crisis was not 
as precise as it might have been. 
Even though the standards to which the respondent governments are held by the Committee is 
more exacting than under the ECtHR system, as was critiqued in Chapters I and II, the 
ECSR’s approach to the crisis is in many respects an unsatisfactory one. The coming 
reporting cycle, where the Committee may incorporate the complaints explored here, present 
an opportunity to refine conclusions and develop guidance on Charter rights in the crisis.  
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Conclusion 
The complementary relationship of the European Court of Human Rights and the European 
Committee of Social Rights is a part of  overarching directive of the mandate of the CoE; 
found in both of the instruments which these bodies are tasked with upholding: “Considering 
that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity between its 
members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance 
and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Preamble, European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.) 
 “Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity 
between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles 
which are their common heritage and of facilitating their economic and social progress, in 
particular by the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms...” (Preamble, Revised European Social Charter 1996.)   
As different bodies with separate – but interconnected – mandates, a comparison can only 
partially explain the differences in approach and outcome between the ECtHR and the ECSR. 
The purpose of the thesis was not to determine whether one body was ‘better’ than the other 
during the crisis. The comparison merely served to illustrate that if the indivisibility of all 
human rights – civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural, is to become a 
reality in Europe, the approach of these human rights bodies to the economic crisis can be 
better explored when viewed side by side. 
The ECtHR’s response to the social Euro-crisis cases largely conveyed the message that the 
economic crisis represented so great a risk to Europe that the prerogative of the national 
authorities could not be trespassed upon. The lack of elaboration of its decisions and the 
underlying reasoning is concerning for the reasons outlined in Chapter II; the function of an 
international human rights court in times of crisis is to act as an external control, and 
adopting a deferential attitude towards national executives in these situations can diminish 
that vital role. It must be recalled, however, that the claimants in the social Euro-crisis cases 
were largely materially quite well off, even after the significant cuts to pay, pensions and 
welfare payments. The ECtHR appeared to rely on this factor – it remains to be seen whether 
applicants who have experienced a much greater fall in living standards as a result of 
austerity measures will receive a different response from Strasbourg. 
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The ECSR’s judgments do appear to be more robust – it repeatedly asserts that it is for it to 
assess compliance with the Charter, and not the respondent government. The deferral to the 
respondent government is more qualified in the Collective Complaints. It cannot be ignored, 
however, that the Committee introduces some new criteria to ensure compliance with the 
Charter, without sufficiently detailing what such novel requirements might entail. This may 
be addressed in future Conclusions by the Committee, as the complaints examined in this 
thesis fell in the middle of a reporting cycle.  
In many of the cases, before both the ECtHR and the ECSR, the applicants attempt to 
demonstrate the perceived unfairness of the measures affecting them by submitting 
alternative measures which might have been adopted at a lesser cost to the individual’s rights 
and interests. As has been discussed in Chapter I, the fact that most of the social Euro-crisis 
cases were decisions on the admissibility, not considered sufficiently important enough to 
proceed to a full Chamber judgment, was highly relevant here. Such decisions tend to be 
brief, with the decision of the Court being particularly cursory and not much consideration 
given to the alternatives proffered by the applicants. The risk of the ECtHR being swamped 
with complaints has necessitated such an approach. The relative obscurity of the ECSR 
system allows for a much more generous approach, with the Committee able to consider a 
wide range of differing views from other sources and engage in adversarial proceedings, with 
the complainant organisation and the respondent government presented with the other’s 
submissions and given the opportunity to respond. Whatever the other curbs placed on the 
exercise of its jurisdiction, the ECSR does not suffer from time constraints.313  
The standards which are set and the safeguards put in place are there to ensure that socio-
economic interests are upheld precisely when they are most needed. In having regard to the 
contributions made by the ECtHR and the ECSR, it is helpful to recall the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Cabral Barreto in Jahn and Others v Germany, where the overly-deferential stance 
towards the German Government’s decision to deprive the applicants of their property when 
the former German Democratic Republic was uniting with the BRD was criticised in the 
dissenting judgment. The dissenting judges expressed concern at the use of terms such as 
‘exceptional circumstances’, which were incapable of being sufficiently defined and thus 
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posed a risk for the protection of human rights. The judge warned that such a concept was 
state-oriented, and did not properly belong in the reasoning of a human rights court. This is a 
prescient warning, and captures quite well the risks involved in defending human rights in 
times of economic crisis. 
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